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ABSTRACT: This paper is designed to assist health care payers and policymakers to restructure 
payment systems in ways that will improve the quality of health care and reduce (or slow the 
growth in) the costs of health care. Drawing on the research and proposals of many researchers and 
practitioners, it attempts to: summarize the key concepts involved in any discussion of ways to 
restructure payment systems; catalog the quality and cost problems that current payment systems 
create; list the key concerns that have been raised about pay-for-performance systems in health 
care; propose 12 goals that revised payment systems should seek to achieve in order to effectively 
address the problems; define the specific issues that need to be resolved in order to achieve these 
goals; describe the primary options for addressing each of these issues; and suggest a general 
strategy for making progress on payment restructuring. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Support for this research was provided by The Commonwealth Fund, the California HealthCare 
Foundation, and the Jewish Healthcare Foundation. The views presented here are those of the author 
and not necessarily those of The Commonwealth Fund, the California HealthCare Foundation, the 
Jewish Healthcare Foundation, or their directors, officers, or staff. This and other Fund publications 
are available online at www.commonwealthfund.org. To learn more about new publications 
when they become available, visit the Fund’s Web site and register to receive e-mail alerts. 
Commonwealth Fund pub. no. 1062. 
  
 CONTENTS 
 
About the Author ........................................................................................................... iv 
Acknowledgments .......................................................................................................... iv 
Executive Summary......................................................................................................... v 
I. Introduction ............................................................................................................1 
II. Key Concepts for Restructuring Payment Systems ...................................................3 
A. Definitions of Terms........................................................................................3 
B. Types of Payment Methods .............................................................................4 
C. Types of Patients/Conditions...........................................................................9 
D. Types of Costs and “Bundling” of Payment ................................................... 10 
E. Indirect and Long-Run Costs ........................................................................ 11 
F. Number and Types of Payers and Providers ................................................... 12 
G. Performance Categories for Health Care Systems ........................................... 13 
III. Problems with Current Health Care Payment Systems ........................................... 15 
A. Prevention of Illness and the Progression of Illness ......................................... 15 
B. Accuracy of Diagnosis/Prognosis ................................................................... 16 
C. Appropriateness of Care................................................................................. 17 
D. Avoidance of Adverse Events......................................................................... 21 
E. Follow-Up to Care........................................................................................ 22 
F. Efficiency and Cost Reduction ...................................................................... 23 
IV. Concerns Regarding Current Pay-for-Performance Systems .................................. 25 
V. Potential Goals for Effective Value-Based Health Care Payment Systems................ 27 
VI. Creating a Value-Based Health Care Payment System............................................ 29 
A. Creating a Value-Based Payment System for Care of Major Acute Episodes ..... 30 
B. Creating a Value-Based Payment System for Care of Chronic Conditions........ 42 
C. Creating a Value-Based Payment System for Care of Minor Acute Episodes..... 52 
D. Creating a Value-Based Payment System for Preventive Care ........................ 61 
VII. Incentives for Performance Beyond Basic Payment Structures ................................ 69 
VIII. Patient Categories, Care Guidelines, Costs, Measures of Performance, 
and Transparency................................................................................................... 76 
IX. Implementation of Changes in Payment Systems.................................................... 81 
X. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 83 
References..................................................................................................................... 84 
 iii
 ABOUT THE AUTHOR 
 
Harold D. Miller, M.S., is the Strategic Initiatives Consultant for the Pittsburgh Regional 
Health Initiative and the Jewish Healthcare Foundation in Pittsburgh. He is also president of 
Future Strategies, LLC, a management and policy consulting firm in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 
and he serves as adjunct professor of Public Policy and Management at Carnegie Mellon 
University’s Heinz School of Public Policy and Management. Miller previously served as 
the president of the Allegheny Conference on Community Development, the executive 
director of the Pennsylvania Economy League of Southwestern Pennsylvania, the associate 
dean of the H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management at Carnegie Mellon 
University, and director of the Governor’s Office of Policy Development in Pennsylvania 
during the Thornburgh Administration. Miller received his master of science in public 
management and policy from the Heinz School at Carnegie Mellon University. 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
This paper was originally prepared for the Network for Regional Healthcare Improvement, 
which convened a national summit on March 29, 2007, in order to accelerate thinking about 
how health care payment systems can be redesigned to reward quality as well as reduce 
costs. The paper is based on the ideas and research of many practitioners and researchers. 
The author is grateful for the extremely valuable comments and input on earlier drafts of 
this paper provided by Sophia Chang, Karen Wolk Feinstein, Michael Forlenza, Anne 
Gauthier, Peter Lee, Tania Lyon, Sanne Magnan, Barbra Rabson, Stephen Schoenbaum, 
Anthony Shih, Stanley Wallack, and Nancy Zionts, but any errors or omissions in the 
current version are entirely the responsibility of the author. The Commonwealth Fund, 
the California HealthCare Foundation, and the Jewish Healthcare Foundation provided 
financial support for the preparation of this paper. 
 
 iv
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The Need for Improved Payment Systems 
A growing number of health care professionals around the country are increasingly 
frustrated by health care payment systems that do not reward efforts to improve health 
care quality, and that often penalize them financially. There is fairly widespread agreement 
that one reason for high costs and quality gaps is that current health care payment systems 
impose significant financial penalties and offer disincentives to providers (hospitals, 
physicians, and others) who supply quality, efficient care (e.g., lower-cost services, higher-
quality care, cognitive services, preventive care, etc.), while they offer significant 
incentives for providing expensive, inefficient care (e.g., invasive treatment, use of 
technology, etc.) irrespective of outcomes. 
 
Current payment systems create penalties and disincentives across all elements of 
health care, including the prevention of illness, diagnosis, treatment of conditions, and the 
follow-up to care. For example: 
 
• Current fee-for-service systems generally do not pay adequately (or at all) for many 
elements of preventive care. In addition, low payment levels are believed to 
discourage physicians from entering primary care, as opposed to specialty care. 
• Payers often do not have an incentive to invest in preventive care, since the payoff 
in terms of better health and lower costs occurs in the (distant) future and may 
accrue to other payers. 
• Fee-for-service systems may not pay adequately for the time needed by a provider 
to make an accurate diagnosis and to develop an appropriate care plan and discuss 
it with their patient, particularly in complex or unusual cases. At the same time, 
providers are not financially penalized for ordering more tests, regardless of 
whether the tests are necessary to make an accurate diagnosis/prognosis. 
• Fee-for-service payment systems reward providers for supplying more services, 
even if the services are unnecessary or of low value. Moreover, payment systems 
generally pay for services regardless of whether all of the processes recommended 
in clinical practice guidelines are performed by the provider, and research has 
shown that large proportions of patients do not receive important elements of care. 
• Under most payment systems, providers are paid more for patients experiencing 
adverse events, particularly serious adverse events resulting in multiple 
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 complications, and the providers’ “profits” on patients experiencing such events 
may actually be higher than on patients with no adverse events. 
• Payment systems reinforce fragmentation of care by paying multiple providers for 
multiple services or tests for the same patient, regardless of whether the care is 
coordinated or duplicative. 
• Current payment systems generally do not pay hospitals or physicians more to 
manage the needs of patients with complex conditions after discharge from the 
hospital or to work proactively to encourage and assist the patient in complying 
with post-discharge instructions in order to improve outcomes and prevent 
rehospitalization. 
• Patients generally do not have a financial incentive to adhere to prevention and 
disease management recommendations that could improve outcomes and reduce 
health care costs. Copayments and deductibles may discourage or prevent 
individuals from obtaining desirable preventive care services. 
• Many payers do not have mechanisms for encouraging or directing patients to 
providers who supply better value—i.e., care at lower cost for the same quality, or 
higher quality at the same cost. 
 
The Weaknesses of Current Pay-for-Performance Systems 
Although a wide range of pay-for-performance, or P4P, systems have been developed to 
try to counteract some of these kinds of problems, there is growing concern that these 
systems are inadequate and potentially counterproductive. For example: 
 
• The amount of performance bonuses and penalties in most P4P systems is 
relatively small, reducing the likelihood that they will overcome the problems they 
are intended to address. In fact, the reductions in a provider’s net revenues from 
implementing a quality improvement initiative may exceed the payment incentives 
provided through a P4P system for that initiative. 
• Most P4P systems focus on rewarding processes, rather than outcomes, which may 
(a) reward providers with poorer outcomes, and (b) unintentionally deter 
innovation and experimentation with new processes that achieve better outcomes. 
• Measures are only available for a subset of the processes that are important to good 
outcomes; P4P systems that reward a subset of processes may divert attention from 
other important processes. 
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 • Providing incentives based on outcomes (or even some processes) can create 
incentives for providers to exclude or under-treat patients who are likely to have 
poor outcomes or to be non-compliant with treatment regimes, or to over-treat 
patients who are likely to have better outcomes or be more compliant. 
• Because of the fragmentation of care, it is often difficult or impossible to clearly 
assign responsibility for performance or lack of performance to a particular provider. 
 
Potential Goals for Effective Value-Based Health Care Payment Systems 
In order to address the problems with current payment systems and avoid the concerns 
about existing pay-for-performance systems, the following are 12 potential goals that 
revised payment systems should seek to achieve: 
 
1. Payment systems should enable and encourage providers to deliver accepted 
procedures of care to patients in a high-quality, efficient, and patient-centered manner. 
2. Payment systems should support and encourage providers to invest, innovate, and 
take other actions that lead to improvements in efficiency, quality, and patient 
outcomes and/or reduced costs. 
3. Payment systems should not encourage or reward over-treatment, use of unnecessarily 
expensive services, unnecessary hospitalization or rehospitalization, provision of 
services with poor patient outcomes, inefficient service delivery, or choices about 
preference-sensitive services that are not compatible with patient desires. 
4. Payment systems should not reward providers for under-treatment of patients or 
for the exclusion of patients with serious conditions or multiple risk factors. 
5. Payment systems should not reward provider errors or adverse events. 
6. Payment systems should make providers responsible for quality and costs within 
their control, but not for quality or costs outside of their control. 
7. Payment systems should support and encourage coordination of care among 
multiple providers, and should discourage providers from shifting costs to other 
providers without explicit agreements to do so. 
8. Payment systems should encourage patient choices that improve adherence to 
recommended care processes, improve outcomes, and reduce the costs of care. 
9. Payment systems should not reward short-term cost reductions at the expense of 
long-term cost reductions, and should not increase indirect costs in order to reduce 
direct costs. 
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 10. Payment systems should not encourage providers to reduce costs for one payer by 
increasing costs for other payers, unless the changes bring payments more in line 
with costs for both payers. 
11. Payment systems should minimize the administrative costs for providers in 
complying with payment system requirements. 
12. Different payers should align their standards and methods of payment in order to 
avoid unnecessary differences in incentives for providers. 
 
Issues and Options for Improved Health Care Payment Systems 
Five categories of issues need to be addressed in redesigning health care payment systems 
to meet these goals: 
 
1. What basic method of payment should be used to compensate providers for care, 
i.e., fee-for-service, episode-of-care, capitation, or some other approach; 
2. Whether payments for multiple providers should be “bundled” together; 
3. How the actual level of payment should be determined; 
4. What performance standards should be set and whether incentives for performance 
should be added to the basic payment method; and 
5. Whether specific incentives should be provided to patients regarding choice of 
providers and participation in care. 
 
There are multiple options available to address each of these issues, many of which 
are described in Section VI of the paper. In addition, different types of payment may be 
appropriate for different types of patients and conditions. Section VI provides examples of 
how the options can be combined into revised payment systems for several types of 
patients and conditions. 
 
If incentives for performance are to be used, then nine additional issues should 
be addressed: 
 
1. How should payments be changed based on provider compliance with 
non-mandatory processes? 
2. How should payments be changed based on provider achievement of 
better patient outcomes? 
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 3. How should payments be changed based on reduced utilization of services (or 
otherwise lower costs or slower growth in costs)? 
4. How should payments be changed based on achievement of higher patient 
satisfaction levels? 
5. Should payments be changed based on any other situations? 
6. What threshold of performance should trigger payment changes? 
7. How large should rewards or penalties be relative to base payment levels? 
8. How should high-cost patients be protected against exclusion from care? 
9. Should there be any adjustment in payment levels to reflect costs of information 
technology that providers need in order to comply with requirements for reporting 
on processes, outcomes, patient satisfaction, or reduced utilization/cost? 
 
Again, there are multiple options available for addressing these issues, many of 
which are described in Section VII of the paper. 
 
In addition, both basic payment systems and incentive systems presume the 
existence of: 
 
• Categories of diagnosis and patient severity (with age and risk) for which payment 
levels can be consistently established; 
• Guidelines for care (often called Clinical Practice Guidelines) for each category 
of diagnosis and patient severity; 
• Estimates of the cost to providers of following guidelines for care in an 
efficient manner; 
• Performance measures for each category of diagnosis and patient severity; and 
• Methods of collecting and reporting on performance measures. 
 
In many regions of the country, systems are in place for one or more of these 
activities, but in others, they are not. In addition, concerns have been raised about 
whether the processes that are in place at the national level are moving quickly enough. 
Options for addressing these issues are described in Section VIII of the paper. 
 
Finally, several important issues need to be resolved in implementing a desired 
payment system, including: 
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 • How should payment changes be phased in? 
• Should payment changes be required to be “budget neutral?” 
• How will the effects of payment changes be evaluated? 
Some options for addressing these issues are described in Section IX of the paper. 
 
Next Steps in Improving Payment Systems 
Unfortunately, there are no easy answers regarding which options offer the best resolution 
for these many issues. Uncertainty exists due to the fact that there have been relatively few 
cases where significantly different payment systems have been attempted, and even fewer 
where thorough evaluations have been conducted. This leads to several conclusions about 
next steps: 
 
• Payment demonstration projects must be developed, implemented, and evaluated 
in order to make progress on payment reform. 
• A wide variety of payment demonstrations are needed. Just as experimentation and 
evaluation is a hallmark of evidence-based medicine, experimentation and 
evaluation will also likely be needed in order to develop the most effective cure for 
the ills of the payment system. 
• The leadership for payment reform demonstrations should come from the regional 
level, rather than the national level. Health care is a fundamentally regional 
enterprise, since most providers and even most payers operate exclusively or 
primarily in metropolitan regions, states, or multi-state areas. 
• While payment demonstrations can and should be pursued at the regional level, 
this does not mean that payment reform should be a parochial enterprise. Indeed, 
just as medicine itself advances the state of the art through local innovations that 
are supported, replicated, and evaluated nationally, so too can payment reform be 
more successful if there is national support for the development, evaluation, and 
replication of regional payment demonstrations. 
 
 x
 CREATING PAYMENT SYSTEMS TO ACCELERATE VALUE-DRIVEN 
HEALTH CARE: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR POLICY REFORM 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A growing number of health care professionals around the country are increasingly frustrated 
by health care payment systems that do not reward efforts to improve health care quality, 
and that often financially penalize them. There is fairly widespread agreement that: 
 
Premise 1.1: Health care systems are not providing the highest quality care 
possible for the money currently being spent. 
Premise 1.2: The same or higher quality health care could be provided for less 
money than is being spent today. 
Premise 2: One reason for high costs and quality gaps is that current health 
care payment systems attach significant financial penalties and offer 
disincentives to providers (hospitals, physicians, and others) who 
supply quality, efficient care (e.g., lower-cost services, higher-
quality care, cognitive services, preventive care, etc.) and significant 
incentives for providing expensive, inefficient care (e.g., invasive 
treatment, use of technology, etc.) irrespective of outcomes. 
Premise 3: Factors other than the financial penalties and disincentives in the 
payment system also cause increased costs and reduced quality of 
health care (e.g., lack of training for health care professionals in 
methods of identifying and reducing waste; and defensive medicine 
driven by liability concerns). 
Premise 4: Changing the structure of payment systems appropriately has the 
potential to increase the quality and/or reduce (or at least control 
the growth in) the costs of health care. 
 
In order to address the problems described in Premises 1.1, 1.2, and 2, and to 
realize the opportunity inherent in Premise 4, there are two basic paths which the health 
care industry could follow: 
 
Path #1: Eliminate or modify the aspects of current health care payment 
systems that provide penalties or disincentives for lower-cost, 
higher-quality health care. 
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 Path #2: Add new rewards or incentives to existing health care payment 
systems to encourage lower-cost, higher-quality health care. 
 
Most current pay-for-performance (P4P) programs and demonstrations are 
following primarily Path #2, leaving the current payment system structure alone, and 
adding a new layer of rewards and incentives on top of it. 
 
However, there appears to be a growing consensus among health care purchasers, 
plans, providers, researchers, and policy-makers that Path #2 alone is inadequate, and that: 
 
Premise 5: In order to achieve the most efficient, effective, and sustainable 
improvements in quality and reductions (or slowing the growth) in 
costs, the penalties and disincentives in current health care payment 
systems need to be eliminated or modified (i.e., Path #1), in addition 
to adding rewards or incentives (Path #2). 
 
Consistent with this premise, this paper attempts to outline information needed to 
address two key questions: 
 
Question 1: What fundamental changes should be made in the structure of current 
health care payment systems in order to eliminate (or significantly 
reduce) the current penalties and disincentives for higher-quality, 
lower-cost health care? 
Question 2: What incremental rewards or penalties, if any, should be added to 
restructured health care payment systems in order to encourage 
higher-quality, lower-cost health care and discourage lower-quality, 
higher-cost health care? 
It is important to recognize the implications of Premise #4: Not all quality and 
cost problems are caused by payment systems, and not all quality and cost problems can be 
resolved by changes in payment systems—i.e., payment reform is not a panacea for the 
problems in health care. In designing and evaluating changes to payment systems, it will 
be important to clearly define what kinds of changes in quality and cost are expected to 
result and what is the logical connection between the payment system changes and the 
expected changes in quality and/or cost. 
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 II. KEY CONCEPTS FOR RESTRUCTURING PAYMENT SYSTEMS 
Discussions about payment systems in health care inherently encompass several key 
concepts: the different types of methods by which payment can be made to health care 
providers; the different types of patients and conditions for which payment is being made; 
the different types of costs involved; and the different types of performance that payment 
systems might be expected to encourage (or not discourage). In order to help organize 
discussions regarding ways to restructure payment systems, definitions and potential 
taxonomies for each of these concepts are offered below. 
 
A. Definitions of Terms 
For simplicity, the term “payer” is used throughout this paper to refer to organizations or 
individuals purchasing health care directly from health care providers, whether they be 
health insurance plans, self-insured organizations (directly or through third-party 
administrators), government agencies paying for health care (such as Medicare and state 
Medicaid agencies), or self-pay individuals. The cost or payment by the ultimate purchaser 
(e.g., an employer) may be very different from the cost or payment by a health plan that 
they use as the direct payer, but this is a function of the structure of the insurance contract 
between the purchaser and the payer, and will not be addressed in this paper. This paper 
will focus on payments made directly to providers for care of patients and on the costs 
incurred by patients and their employers for both the provision of health care and the 
results of health care (see Section II-E). However, it is important to note that the benefit 
and cost structure of health plans has a significant effect on both the payment structure for 
providers and the incentives for patients. 
 
The term “provider” is used to refer to organizations and individuals providing 
health care to individuals, including hospitals, physicians, clinics, nursing homes, 
diagnostic labs, etc. This may include patients themselves, through self-care regimes. 
 
The term “patient” is used to refer to individuals receiving health care services, 
including healthy individuals receiving preventive care. 
 
The term “care” refers to services and processes designed to improve patients’ 
health or prevent it from worsening. This includes services provided by patients 
themselves, as well as by physicians, diagnostic services at laboratories, drugs and medical 
devices (whether self-administered or administered by health professionals), and non-
physician services and facility-based care, such as hospitals, home health agencies, 
rehabilitation facilities, nursing homes, etc. (See Section II-D.) 
 
 3
 An “episode of care” involves a set of services whose beginning and end is defined 
by the beginning and end of the patient’s condition or course of treatment, rather than the 
beginning and end of a particular provider’s service or services. Theoretically, a full 
episode of care runs from the initial diagnosis of a condition to completion of all treatment 
of that condition. However, because some patients will never be “cured” of a condition, 
such as patients with a chronic disease, and because patients who do not have a 
preventable disease may take preventive steps for a long period of time, for practical 
purposes an episode of care for preventive health or chronic disease may be defined in a 
more time-limited fashion. Similarly, because of fragmented delivery structures, some 
episode-of-care payment systems focus on a portion of the complete episode of care that is 
delivered by a particular provider or group of providers (see Sections II-B and II-D). 
 
A “payment system” is the methodology that a payer uses to compensate one or 
more providers for the care provided to a patient. This includes definitions of what will be 
compensated and what will not be compensated, the general way that compensation will 
vary depending on characteristics of the patient or the care provided, which providers 
and/or costs will be covered under a single payment, etc. 
 
The term “value” will be used to refer to the ratio of the quality of health care to 
the cost of care—i.e., more quality for the same cost is higher value, and the same quality 
for lower cost is also higher value. 
 
The term “value-based payment system” means that in some fashion, payment is 
based on the value of care provided. 
 
B. Types of Payment Methods 
Although there are many different ways to pay for health care, one can define six different 
conceptual types of payment methods along a continuum (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Continuum of Health Care Payment Methods
Risk: Patient over-treatment Risk: Patient under-treatment
Fee-for-
service
(FFS)
Per diem Episode-
of-care
payment
(ECP)
Multi-provider
bundled
episode-
of-care
payment
Condition-
specific
capitation
Full
capitation
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 1. Fee-for-Service (FFS). A provider is paid a fee for each specific service rendered. 
2. Per Diem. A provider is paid a fee for each day of care, covering all services 
rendered during that day. 
3. Episode-of-Care Payment (ECP). A provider is paid a fee for all services 
rendered during a single episode of care or portion of an episode of care. (For 
example, the DRG prospective payment system currently used for hospitals by 
Medicare and other payers is an episode of care system, although it only covers the 
portion of the full episode of care that occurs in the hospital. In addition, surgeons 
are typically paid a single amount for all services associated with a particular 
episode of care, rather than separate fees for surgery and follow-up care.) 
4. Multi-Provider Bundled Episode-of-Care Payment. Two or more providers 
are jointly paid a fee for their combined services rendered during a single episode 
of care. (The beginning and/or end of the episode of care may also change when 
multiple providers are included; for example, an “episode-of-care” payment system 
for hospitals typically ends upon discharge from the hospital, and an “episode-of-
care” payment system for home health services typically begins after hospital 
discharge, but a bundled hospital/home health episode-of-care payment would 
treat hospital discharge as merely a step in a single, longer episode of care.) 
5. Condition-Specific Capitation. A fee is paid to cover all services rendered by 
all providers to deal with a particular condition, either on a one-time basis (for 
short-term conditions) or on a regular, periodic basis (for longer-term conditions, 
such as chronic diseases). 
6. Capitation. A regular, periodic fee is paid to cover some or all services rendered 
by all providers for all conditions affecting a particular patient. 
 
(This structure is adapted from various authors, particularly J. C. Robinson, “Theory and 
Practice in the Design of Physician Incentives,” Milbank Quarterly, June 2001 79(2):149–77.) 
 
Most current payment systems are on the left end of this continuum. Payment for 
hospitals through Medicare has been based on a form of single-provider Episode of Care 
payment (the prospective payment system (PPS) using DRGs) for over 20 years, but many 
private health plans still pay on a per diem or other basis that is closer to a fee-for-service 
system. Payment for physicians is still primarily based on fee-for-service. Capitation plans 
were used heavily in the 1990s under managed care but are being used less now, although 
this varies from state to state and from payer to payer. 
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 The Incentives Associated with Different Payment Methods 
There is no perfect model, because each system inherently creates incentives and 
disincentives for the provider, which in turn create risks for the payer and the patient. 
Payment systems on the left-hand side of the continuum have risks of higher costs to 
payers and over-treatment of patients, while payment systems on the right-hand side of 
the continuum shift the risks of costs to providers, but thereby create risks of under-
treatment of patients. 
 
More precisely, payment systems are structured based on whether the payer or 
provider is at risk for specific variables affecting cost. In a simplified model of the cost to a 
payer for all of the care associated with a particular patient, the variables affecting cost can 
be defined as follows (Figure 2): 
 
Figure 2. Variables Contributing to the Cost of Care
Cost
Patient
Cost
Process
No. of
processes
Service
No. of
services
Episode
of care
No. of
episodes
of care
Condition
No. of
conditions
Patient
X X X X=
 
 
The patient has some conditions requiring care (including preventive care for 
conditions which have not yet been experienced). For each of those conditions, the 
patient may have one or more episodes of care (in the case of heart disease, for example, a 
patient may have multiple heart attacks or require readmission to the hospital for 
complications of an earlier episode of care). For each episode of care, there will likely be 
multiple services provided, often by different providers. Even within each service provided, 
there may be multiple steps or processes involved in providing that service. Each 
process/service has a cost associated with it. 
 
The total costs of care for a patient will be higher if any one of these variables 
increases. Even if a provider performs a particular step in the process at lower cost, if more 
steps are completed for a particular service, and if more services are provided for a 
particular episode of care, etc., then the total cost of care for that patient will be higher. 
 
The different methods of payment assign the risk for the different variables in this 
equation to either the payer or the provider (Figure 3). Shifting the risk to the provider 
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 reduces the risk of over-treatment and higher costs. However, in the process, it creates a 
risk to the patient of under-treatment. 
 
Figure 3. Variables for Which the Provider Is at Risk
Under Alternative Payment Systems
Cost
Patient
Cost
Process
No. of
processes
Service
No. of
services
Episode
of care
No. of
episodes
of care
Condition
No. of
conditions
Patient
X X X X=
Fee-for-service
Episode-of-care payment
Condition-specific capitation
Full capitation
 
 
• For example, fee-for-service payment defines a specific amount for a particular 
service, regardless of how many or how few process steps a provider may be required 
to perform. It is generally agreed that the fee-for-service system creates significant 
incentives for over-treatment. However, within any given service, there is still the 
risk that the patient will not receive all of the processes of care necessary, which 
has led to recent pay-for-performance initiatives to encourage fee-for-service 
providers, such as physicians, to provide more of the desired processes of care. 
• Episode-of-care payment shifts the risk of the number of services for any episode 
of care to the provider (or group of providers), but also thereby creates a risk that 
the patient will receive fewer services than appropriate. 
• Condition-specific capitation creates an incentive for a provider to reduce the 
number of episodes of care. 
• Full capitation creates an incentive for providers to prevent the occurrence of 
illnesses as well as to treat them more efficiently, but puts the providers at risk if 
they have patients who are sicker than average, and creates the risk that patients 
will be under-treated in ways that will affect costs in the long run (see Section II-E). 
 
There is growing interest in payment methods in the middle of the continuum—
staying away from full capitation systems (because of the significant risk they place on 
providers), but also moving away from fee-for-service systems (because of the significant 
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 risk of high costs they place on payers) toward episode-of-care (ECP) systems; from single 
provider ECP systems to multi-provider ECP systems; and to broader definitions of the 
episode of care. The goal has been to create systems that avoid imposing insurance risk on 
providers (i.e., having providers absorb the differences in costs resulting from differences in 
the types of patients and their needs), but giving providers more responsibility for 
managing the full range of costs and outcomes of treatment for patients with similar needs. 
 
Offsetting the Risks and Disadvantages of Alternative Methods 
Each variable that is included within a single payment amount creates a risk that 
the provider receiving the payment will under-treat or exclude patients that have high 
values on that variable (e.g., patients who need an above-average number of services per 
episode of care) in order to reduce their costs in comparison to the payment. Each variable 
that is excluded from a single payment amount creates the risk of over-treatment—i.e., 
that providers will seek additional patients, episodes of care, etc., beyond what otherwise 
might be necessary, in order to increase the total amount of revenue they receive. 
 
Therefore, within a particular payment structure, controls or incentives can be 
developed to counteract these risks. For example, in an episode-of-care payment system, 
one set of controls and incentives could be developed to insure that important care 
processes are not ignored as part of the episode of care, and another set of controls and 
incentives could be developed to discourage providers from providing episodes of care to 
patients who do not need them. 
 
Conceptually, there are several different types of controls and incentives which can 
be developed: 
 
1. Mandates, i.e., requiring that providers do certain things or prohibiting them 
from doing things in order to receive payment, while imposing mechanisms for 
reviewing the level of compliance with those requirements or prohibitions (e.g., 
audits to insure that required processes of care are actually delivered to a particular 
patient to insure under-treatment did not occur); 
2. Non-Financial Incentives, i.e., publicly reporting on providers’ performance 
(e.g., reporting on the frequency with which providers deliver desirable processes 
of care to patients); and 
3. Financial Incentives, i.e., providing payment rewards or penalties to providers 
based on their performance (e.g., providing bonuses for greater compliance with 
specific processes of care or for better patient outcomes). 
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 C. Types of Patients/Conditions 
Different types of payment may be appropriate for different types of patients and 
conditions. Four broad categories of patients and conditions can be defined for considering 
alternative payment structures. (These categories are drawn from “Overview of a 
Reconfigured Health System,” by Harold S. Luft, presented to the Council on Health 
Care Economics and Policy at the Thirteenth Princeton Conference on Reinventing 
Health Care Delivery in the 21st Century, May 24–25, 2006): 
 
1. Care of Major Acute Episodes. This includes conditions such as heart attack, 
stroke, premature delivery, newly diagnosed invasive cancer, or major trauma, and 
is characterized by the patient needing a complex mix of often expensive 
interventions within a relatively brief period of time. 
2. Care of Chronic Conditions. This includes conditions such as diabetes, 
hypertension, heart failure, asthma, etc., but excludes the acute exacerbations of 
the condition that result in a major acute episode. 
3. Care of Minor Acute Episodes. This includes minor wounds, normal childbirth, 
minor respiratory diseases, etc. Some conditions may be self-limiting or may not 
even require treatment, but some may be the early manifestation of something 
more serious or potentially more serious. 
4. Preventive Care. This includes immunizations, screening tests, counseling, etc., 
designed to prevent chronic conditions and some acute episodes. 
 
Each of these categories encompasses a very diverse range of conditions. For 
example, some have suggested that pregnancy and childbirth should be considered as a 
separate category, since in some cases it may be a “major acute episode” and in other cases 
it is more of a “minor acute episode,” and since many aspects of prenatal and postpartum 
maternal and infant care are preventive in nature. However, the issue for this paper is not 
whether these different conditions require different kinds of care, but whether the method 
of payment for care should be different. 
 
The categories are also inherently overlapping. For example, a person with a chronic 
disease will not only need ongoing care for that chronic condition, but care of major acute 
episodes (whether related to the chronic condition or not), care of minor acute episodes 
(whether related to the chronic condition or not), and care to prevent other illnesses. 
 
In the case of chronic conditions, some have suggested that a distinction should be 
made between people with chronic conditions that are “stable” or “routine,” and those 
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 with chronic conditions that are “unstable,” “advanced,” or “complex,” or where the 
patient is sick enough that death within a year “would not be a surprise.” For example, 
Joanne Lynn and David Adamson have suggested that elderly people with chronic, 
progressive, and eventually fatal illness should be considered separately from individuals 
with chronic conditions whose diseases can be successfully managed indefinitely. They 
further identify three different trajectories among the elderly with chronic conditions: 
 
• A short period of evident decline (typical of cancer); 
• Long-term limitations with intermittent exacerbations and sudden dying 
(typical of organ system failure); and 
• Prolonged dwindling (typical of dementia, disabling stroke, and frailty). 
 
(This tripartite structure is from Living Well at the End of Life: Adapting Health Care to Serious 
Chronic Illnesses in Old Age, by Joanne Lynn and David M. Adamson, RAND Health, 2003.) 
 
These categories likely require different types of services and incur different kinds 
of costs (see Sections II-D and II-E) than the other categories, particularly long-term care, 
hospice and palliative care, etc. 
 
D. Types of Costs and “Bundling” of Payment 
For purposes of payment, there are several major types of costs which contribute to the 
overall cost of care, but which are affected by different sets of forces. These types of costs 
are being paid for separately under most current payment systems, but they could also be 
“bundled” together. Six major types of costs include: 
 
1. Primary Care Physician Services 
2. Specialist Physician Services 
3. Diagnostic Services (e.g., lab tests, radiology, etc.) 
4. Drugs and Medical Devices 
5. Short-Term Non-Physician Services and Facilities (e.g., hospitals, home health 
agencies, rehabilitation facilities, etc.) 
6. Long-Term Non-Physician Services and Facilities (e.g., nursing homes, assisted 
living services, etc.) 
 
These different types of costs can represent very different proportions of the total 
costs of care for different patients/conditions. 
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 Payment systems can either pay for these costs separately, or pay for them in 
bundles. For example, currently, hospital DRG payments typically cover diagnostic 
services, drugs and medical devices, and hospital-based services (Types 3, 4, and 5 above), 
but not physician services. Capitation systems may “carve out” some of these costs and pay 
for them separately; for example, medical capitation is limited to costs of medical services, 
whereas long-term care capitation includes long-term care services as well. (See, for 
example, “Aligning Incentives in the Context of Biomedical Innovation,” by James C. 
Robinson, presentation at the National Pay for Performance Summit, February 16, 2007, 
for discussion of how device costs and physician costs can be either bundled into or carved 
out of alternative payment structures.) 
 
E. Indirect and Long-Run Costs 
Most discussions of health care costs focus on the short-term payments made to providers 
for health care services associated with a particular patient. However, there are really four 
major categories of costs that should be considered in examining the impacts of different 
methods of payment: 
 
1. Short-Run Direct Costs. These include the spending by a health care provider 
for immediate services. For example, the payment made to a hospital to treat an 
individual’s pneumonia would be a short-run direct cost. 
2. Short-Run Indirect Costs. These include the cost of lost time from work or 
other activities by an individual while receiving health care services. For example, 
the patient’s lost wages or lost productivity while in the hospital for treatment of 
pneumonia would be a short-run indirect cost. They may also be expanded to 
include the costs associated with time required from caregivers (e.g., if someone 
with a fragile, chronically ill parent needs to take time off from work or leave the 
workforce entirely in order to provide care). 
3. Long-Run Direct Costs. These include expenditures by health care providers in 
the future that are caused or influenced in some fashion by the services (or lack of 
services) provided today (i.e., in the short run). For example, if the failure of an 
individual to receive pneumonia vaccine today results in that individual 
contracting pneumonia in the future, the treatment of that future pneumonia is a 
long-run direct cost of the lack of pneumonia immunization. 
4. Long-Run Indirect Costs. These include the cost of lost time from work or 
other activities in the future resulting in some fashion from the services (or lack 
of services) provided during the short run. 
 
 11
 Since a dollar in the future is worth less than a dollar in the present, one cannot 
directly compare the costs in categories 1 and 2 with the costs in categories 3 and 4 
without computing the “present value” of the latter costs (which in turn requires an 
assumption about inflation and/or interest rates). 
 
In order to properly compare the costs of one payment policy versus another, one 
should ideally estimate all four categories of costs (which requires converting indirect costs, 
such as time saved or lost, into dollars), compute the present value of the future costs, and 
add them together; i.e., 
 
Total Cost = Short-Run Direct Costs +  
   Short-Run Indirect Costs + 
   Present Value of Long-Run Direct Costs + 
   Present Value of Long-Run Indirect Costs 
 
For example, creation of an immunization program would increase short-run direct 
costs (and might even increase short-run indirect costs because of the time involved for 
people to get an immunization), but if it would prevent a communicable disease, it would 
reduce long-run direct and indirect costs. Whether total costs would be higher or lower 
would depend on whether the number of people immunized and the cost of immunization 
(the short-run costs) are higher or lower than the number of people who would otherwise 
become sick in the future and the cost of treating them (the long-run costs). 
 
F. Number and Types of Payers and Providers 
Multiplicity of Payers 
In any given health care market, there are multiple payers, using both public 
sources of funds (Medicare and Medicaid), and private sources (private insurance plans, 
third-party administrators, and self-pay individuals). Each payer typically has different 
methods of paying providers. Any given provider may face significantly different 
incentives and disincentives for the care of patients with similar conditions depending on 
which payer is paying for a patient’s care. 
 
In addition, the different categories of costs described in Section II-E above are 
generally not incurred by the same payer. For example, an investment in preventive care 
for a working-age adult made by an employer and its health plan may increase costs for 
that employer/health plan but reduce costs for Medicare (or another employer/health 
plan) in the future. If an insured individual travels a longer distance to use a provider that 
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 charges less for care, the individual will incur the higher costs of travel while the cost of 
care to the individual’s health plan declines. 
 
Multiplicity of Providers 
The number and types of providers vary significantly from region to region, which 
affects the range of choices available to payers and patients. Small, rural areas may have few 
physicians and a single hospital, whereas large, urban areas will have many physicians, 
multiple hospitals, and a range of alternative providers (clinics, urgent care centers, 
specialty hospitals, etc.). 
 
Where multiple providers are available, individual patients often receive care 
services from multiple providers even within a single episode of care or short period of 
time. (For example, recently released research shows that among Medicare beneficiaries, 
the average patient saw two primary care physicians and five specialists, working in a 
median of four practices, over the course of a year. Patients with chronic conditions saw a 
larger number of physicians and physician practices. See “Care Patterns in Medicare and 
Their Implications for Pay for Performance,” by Hoangmai H. Pham, Deborah Schrag, 
Ann S. O’Malley, Beny Wu, and Peter B. Bach, New England Journal of Medicine, 356:11, 
pp. 1130–39, 2007.) 
 
G. Performance Categories for Health Care Systems 
In its 2006 report, Rewarding Provider Performance, the Institute of Medicine’s Committee 
on Redesigning Health Insurance Performance Measures, Payment, and Performance 
Improvement Programs defined three broad categories of performance that payment 
systems should seek to advance in health care systems: 
 
1. Clinical Quality, which encompasses effectiveness, safety, timeliness, and equity; 
2. Patient-Centeredness, an attribute of care that reflects the informed preferences 
of the patient and the patient’s significant others, as well as timeliness and equity; and 
3. Efficiency, defined as achieving the highest level of quality for a given level 
of resources. 
 
Within the clinical quality category, there are two fundamentally different types 
of measures one can use to assess performance and potentially to modify payments 
to providers: 
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 1a. Process Measures, i.e., measures of the specific procedures or tasks carried out 
by providers or patients, e.g., administration of drugs, examinations or testing for 
specific issues, etc. 
1b. Outcome Measures, i.e., measures of the patient’s health or quality of life, 
e.g., death, disability, etc. 
 
Within the patient-centeredness category, there are some conditions where 
multiple care options exist that involve significant tradeoffs affecting the patient’s quality 
and/or length of life. Decisions about this “preference-sensitive” care cannot be based on 
clinical guidelines alone, but need to reflect the patient’s personal values and preferences 
(see “Preference-Sensitive Care,” Dartmouth Atlas Project, 2007). 
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 III. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT HEALTH CARE PAYMENT SYSTEMS 
At the risk of oversimplifying, one can define five major areas where the performance of 
health care systems can affect patient outcomes and/or health care costs (Figure 4): 
 
1. Prevention of Illness and the Progression of Illness 
2. Accuracy of Diagnosis/Prognosis 
3. Appropriateness of Care 
4. Avoidance of Adverse Events 
5. Follow-Up to Care 
 
Figure 4. Ways in Which Health Care Performance
Affects Outcomes
Symptoms Appropriatecare
Inaccurate
diagnosis
No adverse
event
Good
follow-up
Patient Healthy
Inappropriate
care
Adverse
event
Poor
follow-up
Accurate
diagnosis
GOOD
OUTCOME
POOR
OUTCOME
 
 
In each of these areas, current payment systems create penalties and disincentives 
for improved outcomes and/or lower costs. In addition, payment systems can more 
generally discourage efficiencies in care or increase costs of care. 
 
The following sections attempt to summarize the problems that exist in each area 
in order to provide a foundation for the sections that follow. 
 
A. Prevention of Illness and the Progression of Illness 
One of the purposes of the health care delivery system, particularly through primary 
care physicians, is to help prevent illnesses (or disease states) from occurring or worsening. 
In addition, depending on the illness, patient adherence and the physical environment 
(e.g., public health factors) can be significant factors in the success of prevention efforts. 
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 Problem 1.1: Current fee-for-service systems generally do not pay adequately 
(or at all) for many elements of primary care and preventive care. 
In addition, low payment levels are believed to discourage 
physicians from entering primary care as opposed to specialty care. 
Problem 1.2: Current fee-for-service systems generally do not pay adequately 
(or at all) for the more complex care issues associated with the 
elderly and other people with chronic conditions. 
Problem 1.3: Patients generally do not have a financial incentive to adhere to 
prevention and disease management recommendations that could 
reduce health care costs. 
Problem 1.4: Payers may not have an incentive to invest in preventive care if 
the payoff in terms of better health and lower costs occurs in the 
(distant) future and may accrue to other payers. 
 
B. Accuracy of Diagnosis/Prognosis 
Once an illness has occurred, prompt and accurate diagnosis (i.e., determining what 
condition[s] the patient has) and prognosis (i.e., projecting the likely course of the 
condition[s] with and without treatment) are essential to appropriate care. Inaccurate 
diagnoses and prognoses may result in (a) unnecessary or inappropriate care, with the 
associated expenses and risk of adverse effects, and/or (b) the failure to apply appropriate 
care in a timely fashion, potentially leading to poorer outcomes. This area appears to have 
been subject to the least research. 
 
Problem 2.1: Fee-for-service systems may not pay adequately for the time needed 
by providers to make an accurate diagnosis/prognosis and to discuss 
it with patients, particularly in complex or unusual cases. 
Providers can have a financial incentive to order more diagnostic 
tests rather than spend more time with a patient to explore 
symptoms more carefully. 
Problem 2.2: Under fee-for-service systems, providers are not compensated for 
investments in information systems that could assist in making an 
accurate diagnosis/prognosis. 
Problem 2.3: Under fee-for-service systems, providers are not financially 
penalized for ordering more tests, regardless of whether the tests are 
necessary to make an accurate diagnosis/prognosis. 
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 Malpractice concerns may encourage over-testing, but fee-for-
service payment eliminates the financial penalty faced by the 
provider for doing so. 
Problem 2.4: Under fee-for-service systems, providers are paid for conducting 
tests regardless of whether they are necessary to make an accurate 
diagnosis/prognosis. 
Problem 2.5: Under fee-for-service systems, providers making 
diagnoses/prognoses are paid regardless of the accuracy of the 
diagnosis/prognosis. 
Problem 2.6: Current payment systems can financially reward providers for 
making overly optimistic prognoses of the likelihood of survival or 
the benefits of treatment. 
For example, overly optimistic prognoses can lead patients in the 
final stages of terminal illnesses to pursue expensive treatment rather 
than palliative care. 
Problem 2.7: Under fee-for-service systems, providers that supply testing 
information used in making diagnoses/prognoses are paid regardless 
of the accuracy of their collection and interpretation of data. 
For example, pathologists play a crucial role in determining 
whether a malignancy is present and in classifying the type and stage 
of a malignancy, which in turn is critical to determining whether 
and what type of treatment is appropriate. Pathologists are paid for 
analyzing tissue and serum samples even if the analysis or 
interpretation is found later to be inaccurate. There is some 
evidence of significant rates of errors in testing. 
Problem 2.8: Patients (and/or families) may request or demand expensive tests 
that may not be appropriate but increase the cost of diagnosis/ 
prognosis, without any financial penalty to the patient for doing so. 
 
C. Appropriateness of Care 
“Appropriateness” can be loosely defined as “not too much,” “not too little,” and “the 
right” care, i.e., the avoidance of over-treatment, under-treatment, and mistreatment. In 
addition, the most appropriate treatment may be no treatment at all, or self-treatment by 
the patient rather than treatment by a separate provider. 
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 This area has been the focus of the largest body of research and discussion in terms 
of the influences of payment systems. 
 
Problem 3.1: Current episode of care payment systems are generally based on the 
average costs that providers report incurring in delivering care, rather 
than the costs associated with providing high-quality, efficient care. 
Depending on the level of quality and efficiency of the care on 
which cost estimates are based, the payment levels in episode of 
care payment systems (e.g., DRGs) may be higher or lower than 
necessary to cover the costs of high-quality care. 
Problem 3.2: Many health care providers explicitly rely on payments that 
significantly exceed costs for certain conditions/patients in order to 
offset losses incurred on other conditions/patients where payments 
do not cover the costs of care. 
As a result, there is resistance by providers to reducing charges (i.e., 
costs to payers) where it is feasible to do so because of the provider’s 
dependency on the cross-subsidy involved. At the same time, this 
creates incentives for the creation of specialty hospitals and clinics 
focusing only on the high-margin patients and conditions. 
Problem 3.3: Certain types of providers or services (e.g., nurse practitioners, 
pharmacists, etc.) may not be covered separately under payment 
systems, even though they are licensed to provide the care, 
reducing the likelihood that they will be used even if they are more 
appropriate than providers/services covered. 
For example, although close attention to appropriate medication 
management during and following inpatient care has been shown to 
improve outcomes and reduce readmissions, pharmacists and pharmacy 
services are not separately paid for under most payment systems. 
Problem 3.4: Fee-for-service systems financially penalize providers for 
eliminating services that do not improve outcomes. 
Problem 3.5: Fee-for-service payment systems reward providers for unnecessary 
services and low-value services. 
As it is often described, the fee-for-service payment system is 
“weighted toward intervention.” 
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 Problem 3.6: Many payment systems not only provide higher reimbursements for 
more expensive procedures, but higher margins over providers’ costs. 
Studies have shown that relatively lower reimbursement is provided 
for services involving primarily cognitive skills (e.g., patient 
assessment and counseling, and prevention services) than services 
involving procedural skills (e.g., surgery and other invasive 
procedures), which also involve expensive equipment and facilities. 
Problem 3.7: Payment is made to whichever inpatient care facility is chosen by a 
patient’s physician (or by the patient, based on where the physician 
practices), in many cases without regard to cost and/or quality. 
Problem 3.8: For choices about preference-sensitive care, payment rates can 
create financial incentives and disincentives for providers to 
influence particular choices by patients. 
For example, if a patient has a choice between medical 
management and surgery to address a particular condition, a 
surgeon may have a financial disincentive to explain the benefits of 
medical management vs. surgery in an unbiased fashion. 
Problem 3.9: Providing palliative care, rather than treatment, to patients in the 
final stages of terminal illnesses can reduce costs and improve 
patient comfort, but current payment systems often reward 
expensive treatment measures in the final stages of life. 
This problem is also related to the problems of inaccurate 
prognosis described earlier—a provider may be rewarded financially 
for providing the treatment selected in response to an overly 
optimistic prognosis. 
Problem 3.10: Payment systems generally pay for services regardless of whether the 
provider performs all of the processes recommended in clinical 
practice guidelines. 
Despite the presumed incentives in the fee-for-service system for 
physicians to provide maximum treatment, studies have shown that 
patients receive only about half of the care processes viewed as 
desirable or essential. This may be because these processes are not 
reimbursed separately (see Section II-B). 
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 Problem 3.11: Episode-of-care payment systems can financially penalize providers 
for adding components of care that could improve long-term 
outcomes but increase short-term direct costs. 
Problem 3.12: Episode-of-care payment systems financially penalize providers for 
accepting patients with above-average treatment needs within a 
particular diagnosis/severity category and for uncontrollable costs of 
drugs and medical devices, unless the patient’s care is expensive 
enough to justify an outlier payment. 
Problem 3.13: Capitation payment systems financially penalize providers for 
accepting patients with above-average treatment needs and for 
uncontrollable costs of drugs, medical devices, etc. 
Problem 3.14: Payment systems reinforce fragmentation of care by paying multiple 
providers for elements of the same episode of care for the same 
patient, regardless of whether the care is coordinated or duplicative. 
Problem 3.15: Different providers (e.g., hospitals and physicians) are generally 
paid separately and through different payment systems with 
different incentives. 
A hospital seeking to improve quality or reduce costs of inpatient 
acute care may not be able to do so without the cooperation of 
physicians (who may be financially penalized for doing so under a 
fee-for-service payment system). Physicians who seek to improve 
quality of inpatient acute care may not be able to do so without the 
cooperation of the hospital (which may be financially penalized 
under a per diem or DRG-type system for doing so). 
Problem 3.16: For hospital care, physicians order the use of drugs or devices, but 
the costs associated with those drugs and devices are typically 
incurred by the hospital and must be absorbed within the payment 
made to the hospital, not by the physician. 
Problem 3.17: Patients and/or families may request or demand expensive drugs, 
devices, or procedures that may not be appropriate but which may 
increase the cost of care, without any financial penalty for doing so. 
Problem 3.18: Many payers do not have mechanisms for encouraging or directing 
patients to providers which provide care at lower cost (for the same 
quality) or higher quality (at the same cost). 
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 Because of this, there is no financial incentive for a provider to charge 
a payer less for care, since there may be no practical way for the 
provider to offset the lost revenue with a greater volume of patients. 
Problem 3.19: Payment systems do not explicitly reward providers for reducing 
indirect costs of care, such as length of time away from work 
(e.g., a worker’s length of stay in the hospital, time spent waiting 
for a doctor’s appointment or testing, etc.). 
 
D. Avoidance of Adverse Events 
A considerable literature has developed regarding the frequency and causes of adverse 
events due to provider errors or neglect. However, there have been relatively few efforts 
to study the impacts of such adverse events on costs and payments, and relatively few 
explicit changes in payment systems to address them. 
 
Problem 4.1: Under most payment systems, providers are paid regardless of 
whether patients experience adverse events under their care. 
Problem 4.2: Under most payment systems, providers are paid more for patients 
experiencing adverse events, particularly serious adverse events 
resulting in multiple complications. 
Although some studies have reported that the increased payments 
to hospitals for adverse events are not sufficient to cover the 
increased costs of care, more recent research suggests that reducing 
adverse events that occur at low rates may negatively impact 
hospital margins. Physicians paid under fee-for-service arrangements 
will likely receive additional fees for additional care of patients who 
experience adverse events. 
Problem 4.3: Providers may benefit financially if they can shift the care of 
patients experiencing adverse events to other providers. 
For example, long-term care facilities are paid for the care they 
provide regardless of whether adverse events occur that may lead to 
hospitalization or other forms of health care; moreover, provisions 
for “bed holding payments” can increase payments to long-term 
care facilities when patients experience adverse events that require 
(or can qualify for) hospitalization. 
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 E. Follow-Up to Care 
For many types of conditions, the full course of care does not occur within the boundaries 
of a single provider. For example, a hospital patient may be discharged to home health 
care for certain kinds of therapies. Moreover, in general, following the completion of 
hospital care or care by a specialist, patients are expected to comply with post-discharge 
instructions under the supervision of their primary care physician. Some patients need 
long-term care in nursing homes, in assisted living facilities or programs, or in hospice 
programs following acute care. 
 
Problem 5.1: Fee-for-service systems do not pay providers adequately for detailed 
discharge planning services. 
Problem 5.2: Fee-for-service systems generally do not pay providers more to 
manage the needs of patients with complex conditions after 
discharge from the hospital or to proactively work to encourage 
and assist the patient in complying with post-discharge instructions. 
Problem 5.3: Although poor medication compliance is a major contributor to 
hospital readmissions, most payment systems do not compensate 
pharmacists for effective medication management (either in addition 
to or instead of a primary care physician). 
Problem 5.4: Most payment systems pay providers regardless of the quality of the 
discharge planning services. 
Problem 5.5: Providers of follow-up care are paid for services regardless of 
whether they follow recommended processes or have poor outcomes. 
Problem 5.6: Providers are paid regardless of whether problems occur after 
leaving their care that could reasonably have been prevented while 
under their care. 
Problem 5.7: Providers may be rewarded financially if a patient experiences a 
problem after discharge from care (that could have been prevented 
during care) and then requires additional care by that provider. 
Problem 5.8: Capitation payment systems financially penalize providers for care of 
patients with above-average treatment needs and for uncontrollable 
costs of drugs, medical devices, etc. 
Problem 5.9: If providers are paid separately for their individual components of a 
sequence of care, earlier-stage providers may be financially rewarded 
(and later-stage providers penalized) if the earlier-stage providers 
discharge/transfer patients earlier or with more significant needs. 
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 Problem 5.10: Patients generally do not experience financial penalties when their 
failure to adhere to post-discharge care recommendations results in 
the need for additional, costly care. 
Problem 5.11: Payment systems may reward providers for increasing indirect costs 
of care, e.g., by imposing greater responsibilities for care on patients 
or family caregivers. 
 
F. Efficiency and Cost Reduction 
Problem 6.1: Many payers are reluctant to make changes in the payment levels 
for individual services or episodes of care, preferring to make 
across-the-board adjustments in a provider’s payment levels, which 
leads to distortions in payments vs. costs. 
For example, DRG systems are based on relative weights for 
individual diagnoses times a base rate for the provider. Many payer-
provider negotiations are limited to changing the amount of the 
base rate, rather than changing the weights for individual diagnoses; 
as a result, a provider that can deliver a particular service at lower 
cost cannot, in effect, charge less for that service without charging 
less for all services (or for a range of services that the payer groups 
together for adjustment). 
Problem 6.2: Some payers prohibit paying for multiple procedures on the same 
day or during the same patient visit, which can discourage efficient 
and coordinated delivery of care. 
Problem 6.3: Requirements that care be delivered by a physician during an office 
visit discourage the use of lower-cost health professionals and the 
use of communications techniques such as e-mail and phone calls 
that are lower in cost and easier for patients. 
Problem 6.4: Payers (purchasers and plans) do not make patients aware of ways to 
reduce costs, or if they do, patients may view them as efforts to 
lower quality of care. 
Problem 6.5: The existence of multiple methods of payment by different payers 
imposes significant administrative costs on providers, which 
increases the costs of care and reduces the time and resources 
available to devote to direct patient care. 
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 Some payment systems are very different—for example, one payer 
may pay a hospital based on DRGs, while another may make per 
diem payments—while others may appear superficially similar, but 
are different in specific details (particularly recently with the growth 
in pay-for-performance incentives). Concerns about anti-trust 
issues can discourage payers and/or providers from agreeing on 
common systems of payment with common incentives and 
administrative requirements. 
Problem 6.6: The existence of multiple methods of payment by different payers 
creates different sets of incentives for providers, which complicates 
the planning and management of patient care. 
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 IV. CONCERNS REGARDING CURRENT PAY-FOR- 
PERFORMANCE SYSTEMS 
A variety of concerns have been raised about the pay-for-performance systems and 
demonstration programs that have been established in an effort to address some of the 
problems described in Section III. The following is a list of some of the major concerns 
that have been raised regarding these systems. 
 
Concern 1: Current pay-for-performance systems do not directly address many 
of the problems described in Section III. 
Concern 2: The amount of performance bonuses and penalties in most pay-for-
performance systems is relatively small, reducing the likelihood they 
will overcome the problems they are intended to address. 
Concern 3: When pay-for-performance programs create funding for bonuses in 
one type of service by reducing base payments across the board, it 
may force providers to cut back services in other areas, or encourage 
providers to shift costs by increasing charges to other payers. 
Concern 4: If pay-for-performance systems provide additional funding for high 
or improved performance without reductions in base payment rates 
or penalties for poor performance, total costs may increase. 
Concern 5: Pay-for-performance systems that provide rewards based on the 
level of compliance with recommended processes may not result in 
improved outcomes. 
Concern 6: Pay-for-performance systems that provide rewards based on 
compliance with recommended processes may unintentionally deter 
innovation and experimentation with new processes that achieve 
better outcomes. 
Concern 7: The reductions in a provider’s net revenues from implementing a 
quality improvement initiative may exceed the payment incentives 
provided through a pay-for-performance system for that initiative. 
Concern 8: Rewarding only the best-performing providers does not provide 
resources to cover the costs that lower-performing providers may 
incur in making efforts to improve. 
Concern 9: Rewarding improvement on composite performance measures 
based on averages of performance on sub-measures may result in 
improvements on the easiest-to-improve sub-measures while 
performance worsens on other sub-measures. 
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 Concern 10: Measures are only available for a subset of the processes that are 
important to good outcomes; pay-for-performance systems that 
reward a subset of processes may divert attention from other 
important processes. 
Concern 11: Process measures in pay-for-performance systems are not applicable 
to all patients with a particular diagnosis, and are not available for 
many diagnoses. 
Concern 12: Providing incentives based on outcomes (or even some processes) 
can create incentives for providers to exclude or under-treat 
patients who are likely to have poor outcomes or to be non-
compliant with treatment regimes, or to over-treat patients who are 
likely to have better outcomes or be more compliant. 
Concern 13: Because of the fragmentation of care, it is often difficult or 
impossible to clearly assign responsibility for performance or lack of 
performance to a particular provider. This makes it difficult to 
award or apportion incentive payments to particular providers. 
Concern 14: A provider’s costs of documenting compliance with processes 
and/or achievement of outcomes may exceed the amount of 
payment incentives the provider receives based on those 
performance measures. 
Concern 15: Different pay-for-performance systems have different standards of 
performance, different incentives, and different reporting 
requirements, increasing administrative costs for providers and 
making it difficult for them to plan and manage care consistently for 
patients who have similar conditions but different payers. 
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 V. POTENTIAL GOALS FOR EFFECTIVE VALUE-BASED HEALTH CARE 
PAYMENT SYSTEMS 
In order to address the problems described in Section III and avoid the concerns about 
existing pay-for-performance systems described in Section IV, the following are twelve 
potential goals that revised payment systems could seek to achieve. 
 
Goal 1: Payment systems should enable and encourage providers to deliver 
accepted procedures of care to patients in a high-quality, efficient, 
and patient-centered manner. 
This goal is intended to address Problems 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 3.1, 3.2, 5.1, 
5.2, and 6.1, and Concerns 1 and 2. 
Goal 2: Payment systems should support and encourage investments, 
innovations, and other actions by providers that lead to 
improvements in efficiency, quality, and patient outcomes and/or 
reduced costs. 
This goal is intended to address Problems 2.2, 3.3, 5.3, 6.2, and 6.3, 
and Concerns 6, 7, and 8. 
Goal 3: Payment systems should not encourage or reward over-treatment, 
use of unnecessarily expensive services, unnecessary hospitalization 
or rehospitalization, provision of services with poor patient 
outcomes, inefficient service delivery, or encouraging choices 
about preference-sensitive services that are not compatible with 
patient desires. 
This goal is intended to address Problems 2.3, 2.4, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 
3.8, and 3.9, and Concerns 4 and 5. 
Goal 4: Payment systems should not reward providers for under-treatment 
of patients or for the exclusion of patients with serious conditions 
or multiple risk factors. 
This goal is intended to address Problems 3.10, 3.12, 3.13, 5.4, 5.5, 
and 5.8, and Concerns 9, 10, 11, and 12. 
Goal 5: Payment systems should not reward provider errors or adverse events. 
This goal is intended to address Problems 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 4.1, 4.2, 5.6, 
and 5.7. 
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 Goal 6: Payment systems should make providers responsible for quality and 
costs within their control, but not for quality or costs outside of 
their control. 
This goal is intended to address Problems 3.12 and 3.13 and 
Concern 13. 
Goal 7: Payment systems should support and encourage coordination of 
care among multiple providers, and should discourage providers 
from shifting costs to other providers without explicit agreements 
to do so. 
This goal is intended to address Problems 3.14, 3.15, 3.16, 4.3, 
and 5.9, and Concern 13. 
Goal 8: Payment systems should encourage patient choices that improve 
adherence to recommended care processes, improve outcomes, and 
reduce the costs of care. 
This goal is intended to address Problems 1.3, 2.8, 3.17, 3.18, 5.10, 
and 6.4. 
Goal 9: Payment systems should not reward short-term cost reductions at 
the expense of long-term cost reductions, and should not increase 
indirect costs in order to reduce direct costs. 
This goal is intended to address Problems 1.4, 3.11, 3.19, and 5.11. 
Goal 10: Payment systems should not encourage providers to reduce costs for 
one payer by increasing costs for other payers, unless the changes 
bring payments more in line with costs for both payers. 
This goal is intended to address Problem 3.2 and Concern 3. 
Goal 11: Payment systems should minimize the administrative costs for 
providers in complying with payment system requirements. 
This goal is intended to address Problem 6.5 and Concerns 14 
and 15. 
Goal 12: Different payers should align their standards and methods of 
payment in order to avoid unnecessary differences in incentives 
for providers. 
This goal is intended to address Problem 6.6 and Concern 15. 
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 VI. CREATING A VALUE-BASED HEALTH CARE PAYMENT SYSTEM 
This section and the following three sections (VII, VIII, and IX) define specific issues that 
need to be resolved in order to achieve the goals defined in Section V, as well as specific 
options for resolving them. 
 
This section deals with issues associated with Question #1 defined in the introduction: 
What changes should be made in current health care payment systems in order to eliminate (or 
significantly reduce) the current penalties and disincentives for higher-quality, lower-cost health care? 
 
Four Groups of Patients/Conditions 
Because the nature of the providers and care is so different across the four 
categories of patients/conditions defined in Section II-C, the core payment issues are 
defined and discussed separately for each of them: 
 
• Subsection VI-A addresses how payment could be structured for care of major acute 
episodes, i.e., conditions such as heart attack, stroke, premature delivery, newly 
diagnosed invasive cancer, or major trauma, that are characterized by the patient 
needing a complex mix of often expensive interventions within a relatively brief 
period of time. 
• Subsection VI-B addresses how payment could be structured for care of chronic 
conditions, i.e., conditions such as diabetes, hypertension, heart failure, asthma, etc. 
• Subsection VI-C addresses how payment could be structured for care of minor acute 
episodes, i.e., minor wounds, normal childbirth, minor respiratory diseases, etc. 
• Subsection VI-D addresses how payment could be structured for preventive care, 
i.e., immunizations, screening tests, counseling, etc., designed to prevent chronic 
conditions and some acute episodes. 
 
As noted in Section II-C, there are significant differences among patients and 
conditions even within these four categories, and some of these may warrant differences in 
payment systems. 
 
Five Categories of Issues 
In Part 1 of each subsection, five categories of issues are addressed: 
 
1. What basic method of payment should be used to compensate providers for this 
type of care; 
2. Whether payments for multiple providers should be “bundled” together; 
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 3. How the actual level of payment should be determined; 
4. What performance standards should be set and whether incentives for performance 
should be added to the basic payment method; and 
5. Whether specific incentives should be provided to patients regarding choice of 
providers and participation in care. 
 
Examples of Restructured Payment Systems 
In Part 2 of each subsection, an example of a possible payment system is described, 
incorporating options from each of the issues. The reader may find it helpful to read Part 2 in 
each subsection first in order to get a broad overview of the kinds of elements which need to 
be combined for payment restructuring, before reviewing the specific issues and options 
in Part 1. 
 
Details of Reward/Incentive Systems 
Section VII deals with issues associated with the second key question defined in 
the introduction: What additional rewards or incentives, if any, should be included in health care 
payment systems in order to encourage higher-quality, lower-cost health care? Each of the 
subsections in Section VI asks generally whether incentives should be provided, but leaves 
to Section VII the issues of how those incentives should be structured. 
 
Other Issues 
Section VIII deals with mechanisms for establishing categories of diagnosis and 
patient severity, guidelines of care, costs, measures of performance, etc., which are 
necessary for either basic payment systems or for incentive systems. 
 
And finally, Section IX deals with an overarching critical issue: Regardless 
of what payment system(s) are defined, what process can payers use to facilitate 
successful implementation? 
 
A. Creating a Value-Based Payment System for Care of Major Acute Episodes 
This subsection focuses on how payers should pay for care of major acute episodes, i.e., 
conditions such as heart attack, stroke, premature delivery, newly diagnosed invasive 
cancer, or major trauma, that are characterized by the patient needing a complex mix of 
often expensive interventions within a relatively brief period of time (see Section II-C). 
 
This subsection is divided into 13 different issues within five groups that need to 
be addressed in order to achieve the goals proposed in Section V: 
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 Basic Payment Method 
1.1 What basic method should be used to pay providers for care of major acute episodes? 
 
Bundling of Payment 
1.2 Should payers bundle together episode-of-care payments to hospitals and to the 
physicians managing the hospital care for major acute episodes into a single payment? 
1.3 Should payers bundle together episode-of-care payments to hospitals and to post-
acute care providers for major acute episodes into a single payment? 
1.4 If payments are defined in bundles, should payers allocate bundled payments 
among providers, or should one accountable provider receive the payment and 
allocate it to other providers? 
1.5 Should there be any restrictions on how profits/losses within a bundled payment 
are divided among providers? 
 
Payment Levels 
1.6 How should the base payment level be determined? 
1.7 Should there be any adjustment in payment levels to reflect differences in costs for 
providers with special characteristics? 
1.8 Should payment levels be adjusted for “outlier” cases? 
 
Performance Standards 
1.9 What level of service or performance should be required in order to receive the 
base payment level? 
1.10 How should payments be changed when preventable adverse events (errors, 
infections, etc.) occur? 
1.11 Should financial incentives beyond the basic payment level be provided for 
differences in performance? 
 
Patient Incentives 
1.12 How should patients be encouraged to choose high-quality/low-cost providers? 
1.13 How should patients be encouraged or assisted to adhere to care processes that 
affect outcomes or costs? 
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 Ways that the payments defined in this section might be modified at the margin to 
reward or penalize varying levels of performance will be discussed separately, in Section VII. 
 
For each issue, options for resolution are suggested. In most cases, there are many 
potential options for addressing an issue; an attempt has been made to identify options that 
differ along major conceptual dimensions, but the specifics of individual options will likely 
need to be modified or enhanced in order to insure that specific goals and concerns are 
addressed. In addition, options for a particular issue may not be mutually exclusive. 
 
1. Key Issues and Options 
Issue 1.1: What basic method should be used to pay providers for 
care of major acute episodes? 
See Section II-B for a general description of the basic alternative 
payment systems. 
Option 1.1.1: A single prospectively defined Episode-of-Care Payment (ECP) 
should be made to cover all of a hospital’s services associated with 
an episode of care for a patient, with the amount adjusted for the 
severity/risk of the patient. Other non-physician services (e.g., 
home health agencies) should be paid in the same way. Physicians 
should be paid on a fee-for-service basis for the services they render 
as part of the episode of care. 
Option 1.1.2: A single prospectively defined ECP should be made to cover all of a 
provider’s services associated with an episode of care for a patient, 
with the amount adjusted for the severity/risk of the patient. All 
providers (hospitals, physicians, home health care agencies, etc.) and 
all costs (e.g., drugs and medical devices) involved in the episode of 
care should be paid on this basis. 
This would be conceptually similar to the current PPS/DRG 
system used by Medicare to pay hospitals, although the bundling of 
payment, the determination of the base payment level, etc., could 
be different, as discussed below. This would be a significant change 
in payment for physicians. 
Issue 1.2: Should episode-of-care payments to hospitals and to the 
physicians managing the hospital care for major acute 
episodes be bundled together into a single payment? 
Currently, most payment systems are designed to pay each provider 
separately for the services they provide. A “bundled” payment means 
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 that a single payment is defined to cover the services of two or more 
providers, with a goal of aligning incentives for all of the providers. 
Option 1.2.1: For major acute episodes, separate payments should be defined and 
made to the hospital and to the physician(s) managing the care. 
Option 1.2.2: For major acute episodes, a single payment should be defined for 
both the hospital and the physician(s) managing the hospital care for 
an episode of care. 
 
Issue 1.3: Should episode-of-care payments to hospitals and to post-
acute care providers for major acute episodes be bundled 
together into a single payment? 
Option 1.3.1: For major acute episodes, separate payments should be defined and 
paid to the hospital and any post-acute care providers associated 
with an episode of care. 
Option 1.3.2: For major acute episodes, a single payment should be defined for 
both the hospital and post-acute care providers associated with an 
episode of care. 
 
Issue 1.4: If payments are defined in bundles, should payers allocate 
bundled payments among providers, or should one 
accountable provider receive the payment and allocate it 
to other providers? 
Option 1.4.1: If payments are defined in bundles, groups of providers should be 
encouraged to create joint arrangements for receiving and allocating a 
payment among themselves. However, where no such arrangement 
has been defined, payers should allocate the payment to individual 
providers based on a standard allocation determined during the 
process of setting the base payment level. 
For example, if the base payment level for inpatient care is set on 
the assumption that 80% of the payment will cover hospital services 
and 20% of the payment will cover physician services, then unless 
the hospital and physician(s) have agreed that one of them (or a 
third party) will receive the entire payment and make different 
allocations among the group, the payer would pay 80% of the 
payment to the hospital and 20% to the physician(s). 
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 Option 1.4.2: If payments are defined in bundles, groups of providers should be 
required to define a single accountable payee for receiving and allocating 
a payment among themselves. 
Option 1.4.3: In the long run, if payments are defined in bundles, groups of 
providers should be required to define a single accountable payee for 
receiving and allocating a payment among themselves. However, in 
the short run, where no such arrangement has been defined, payers 
should allocate the payment to individual providers based on a 
standard allocation determined during the process of setting the base 
payment level. Incentives should be created to encourage groups of 
providers to create joint arrangements for receiving and allocating a 
payment among themselves. 
 
Issue 1.5: Should there be any restrictions on how profits/losses 
within a bundled payment are divided among providers? 
Proposal 1.5: If payments are defined and paid in bundles, providers should be 
free to work out their own arrangements as to how any profits or 
losses incurred on a bundled payment should be divided among them. 
Currently, federal law restricts the ability of hospitals to share profits on 
services with physicians (commonly referred to as “gainsharing”). This 
law would likely need to be changed to accommodate this proposal. 
 
Issue 1.6: How should the base payment level be determined? 
Option 1.6.1: For each combination of diagnosis and patient severity for which a 
separate ECP will be made, providers should propose the amount of 
payment (i.e., their “price” for the episode of care). 
Option 1.6.2: For each combination of diagnosis and patient severity for which a 
separate ECP will be made, a national, state, or regional public–private 
collaborative (with representation from both payers and providers) should 
define a recommended set of best-practice services to be covered by the ECP 
and, where data are available, estimate the current cost for that set of services. 
Actual ECP levels would be determined through negotiations between 
providers and payers. 
Option 1.6.3: For each combination of diagnosis and patient severity for which a 
separate ECP will be made, a national, state, or regional public–private 
collaborative (with representation from both payers and providers) should 
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 determine a recommended payment level based on a study to estimate 
the cost of delivering good quality care for that category of 
diagnosis and severity (i.e., a “suggested price” for the episode of 
care). Providers would either accept the recommended payment level or 
propose a discount below (or premium above) the payment level that they 
will accept (i.e., their “price” for the episode of care) for that 
category of patient. Recommended base payment levels should 
differ from region to region based on the differences in cost-of-
living by region, but providers should capture detailed cost differences 
in their discounts/premiums over the standard payment rate. 
Options 1.6.1, 1.6.2, and 1.6.3 are each consistent with either a 
bidding model or a negotiation model of pricing; in each case, the 
provider proposes a price and the payer would either accept or 
reject the price. Options 1.6.2 and 1.6.3 would introduce a 
“starting point” for bidding or negotiations through the 
recommended payment level. 
Option 1.6.4: For each combination of diagnosis and patient severity for which a 
separate ECP will be made, a national, state, or regional public–private 
collaborative (with representation from both payers and providers) should 
determine the payment level based on a study to estimate the cost of 
delivering good quality care for that combination of diagnosis and 
severity. Payment levels should differ from region to region based 
on the differences in cost-of-living by region. Providers should accept 
the payment level as payment in full for the care provided to patients in 
that category. 
Establishing a uniform payment level across all providers and payers 
in a region will likely raise anti-trust concerns. A special ruling from 
the U.S. attorney general and state attorney(s) general, or legislation, 
may be needed to provide a safe harbor for such a pricing approach 
if appropriate benefits can be demonstrated. 
 
Issue 1.7: Should there be any adjustment in payment levels to reflect 
differences in costs for providers with special characteristics? 
Option 1.7.1: Base payment levels for episodes of care should be increased for 
providers with special characteristics that have been demonstrated 
to increase the average costs of care, such as teaching hospitals, 
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 hospitals and other providers serving large numbers of low-income 
patients, etc. 
Option 1.7.2: Base payment levels for episodes of care should not be adjusted for 
providers with special characteristics; however, payers should 
establish separate payments (or explicit premiums on payment 
levels) in each region to cover these costs. 
 
Issue 1.8: Should payment levels be adjusted for “outlier” cases? 
“Outlier” cases are patients for whom the level of services or costs 
associated with quality care are significantly higher than for other 
patients with the same diagnosis and ostensibly the same severity 
level. Fee-for-service and per diem payments inherently 
compensate providers more for this additional care, but episode-of-
care and capitation systems do not, unless explicit provisions are 
made to do so. For example, Medicare’s inpatient hospital 
prospective payment system provides an outlier payment to a 
hospital if its charges/costs of care exceed a certain threshold above 
the DRG payment for a patient. 
Option 1.8.1: When a provider documents that its total costs of caring for a patient 
exceed a certain multiple of the base payment level for that category of 
patient (based on diagnosis and severity), the provider should 
receive an additional payment to cover a portion of those costs. (Costs 
would be based on information provided on actual costs of care, 
rather than costs computed from charges.) 
Option 1.8.2: When a provider documents that it was required to provide services 
significantly beyond the level assumed in computing the base payment level, 
the provider should receive an additional payment to cover a portion 
of the documented out-of-pocket costs associated with the additional care. 
The distinction between Option 1.8.1 and Option 1.8.2 is that in 
the latter, the provider documents services performed beyond the 
normally expected level of services, rather than costs beyond the 
normally expected level of costs. (Costs may be higher than 
expected simply because of a higher cost structure at the provider, 
rather than because of a higher level of services provided.) Also, in 
Option 1.8.2, the outlier payment is based on out-of-pocket costs 
(e.g., medications, etc.) rather than total costs (e.g., allocations of 
overhead, salaries, etc.). 
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 Option 1.8.3: Some adjustment should be made for cases where the level of 
services required for quality care significantly exceeds typical or 
expected levels, if there is evidence that improved outcomes are 
being achieved through the higher levels of service. 
Option 1.8.4: No adjustment in payment should be made for patients requiring 
significantly more services or costs than were assumed in setting the 
base payment level, but such outlier cases should be documented 
and used by the payer and provider to adjust the diagnosis/severity 
categories (e.g., by adding a new severity level) and/or to adjust 
future base payment levels. 
Failure to provide any adjustment could violate Goal 4, by 
encouraging providers to avoid patients with unusually high 
care needs that are not effectively captured in the severity 
adjustment system. 
 
Issue 1.9: What level of service or performance should be required in 
order to receive the base payment level? 
Because of concerns that many patients are not receiving elements of 
care that have been determined to be appropriate or necessary, most 
current pay-for-performance systems have an explicit or implicit 
goal of encouraging, but not mandating, that providers reach 100% 
compliance with certain processes that have been demonstrated to 
improve patient outcomes. However, an alternative approach 
would be to define processes where 100% compliance is considered 
essential (except where they are clearly contraindicated or where the 
patient is participating in a clinical trial explicitly to test new 
processes) and to require that those processes be performed in order 
to receive payment. 
Option 1.9.1: Payers and/or a public–private collaborative (involving both payers 
and providers) should define those processes that are considered 
mandatory for patients in a particular diagnosis/severity category, 
and providers should only be paid if those processes are delivered, 
unless there is clear documentation that the processes are contra-
indicated for the patient or if the patient is participating in a formal 
clinical trial of alternative processes. 
Option 1.9.2: No mandatory processes should be established in order for 
providers to receive payment. 
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 Issue 1.10: How should payments be changed when preventable 
adverse events (errors, infections, etc.) occur? 
Option 1.10.1: Providers should not be paid more for care needed to address preventable 
adverse events or the complications resulting from such events. 
Option 1.10.2: Providers should be paid for care needed to address preventable 
adverse events, but payment bonuses or penalties should be provided 
based on the rates of preventable adverse events. 
 
Issue 1.11: Should financial incentives beyond the basic payment level 
be provided for differences in performance? 
Option 1.11.1: Specific financial incentives should not be provided to providers; 
instead, comparative information for payers and patients on 
performance levels and prices should be used to drive 
improvements in performance. 
Option 1.11.2: Specific financial incentives should be provided for those aspects of 
care for which the payment system provides inadequate incentives 
or undesirable disincentives. 
Section II-B discusses the areas where incentives may be needed. 
The detailed issues and options for how to implement specific 
financial incentive programs are discussed in Section VII. 
 
Issue 1.12: How should patients be encouraged to choose high 
quality/low-cost providers? 
Option 1.12.1: Patients should be given complete discretion to choose providers, using 
available information on quality and cost of providers as they wish. 
Option 1.12.2: Payers should give patients financial incentives (e.g., lower copays or 
co-insurance amounts) for using providers with higher quality 
and/or lower cost. 
Option 1.12.3: Payers should give patients financial disincentives (e.g., higher copays 
or co-insurance amounts) for using providers with lower quality 
and/or higher cost. 
Option 1.12.4: Payers should refuse to pay for care by the lowest quality and highest cost 
providers, unless the care is provided in emergency circumstances. 
See Section VIII for issues regarding the development and 
dissemination of quality and cost information. 
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 Issue 1.13: How should patients be encouraged or assisted to adhere 
to care processes that affect outcomes or costs? 
Patient preferences and patient adherence as well as provider 
preferences and performance can have a significant impact on 
outcomes and costs. For example, research has indicated that a 
major cause of patients being readmitted to the hospital after 
discharge for treatment of a major acute episode is failure to comply 
with post-discharge instructions. This may be due to poorly 
explained or unrealistic expectations by the hospital or the patient’s 
physician(s), but it can also be due to patient factors outside of the 
control of the hospital and physicians. 
Option 1.13.1: Payers should provide financial incentives to patients (e.g., bonuses 
or reduced copays) for adherence with care processes recommended 
or required by their health care provider. 
Option 1.13.2: Payers should provide financial incentives to providers based on the 
level of patient involvement in care planning and/or patient 
adherence with care processes. 
Option 1.13.3: Providers should give financial incentives to patients (e.g., bonuses or 
reduced copays) for adherence with care processes recommended or 
required by the provider. 
Option 1.13.4: Providers should establish proactive systems for educating, monitoring, 
and encouraging patient adherence, but no explicit financial incentives 
should be provided to patients. 
Combinations of these options can also be considered. 
 
2. Example of a Possible Payment System for Care of Major Acute Episodes 
The following is just one example of how the options from the issues described above 
could be combined into a new method of payment for care of major acute episodes. 
 
Method of Payment 
• A single prospectively defined episode-of-care payment (ECP) would be made to 
cover all of a provider’s services associated with an episode of care for a patient, with 
the amount adjusted for the severity/risk of the patient. All providers (hospitals, 
physicians, home health care agencies, etc.) and all costs (e.g., drugs and medical 
devices) involved in the episode of care would be paid from this single payment. 
 
 39
 Defining a Recommended Base Payment Amount 
• A recommended ECP amount would be established by a regional public-private 
collaborative (involving both payers and providers) for each combination of a 
diagnosis and patient severity level. 
• The recommended ECP amount would be based on the estimated cost of 
delivering all elements of the Clinical Practice Guideline (where one exists) for 
that diagnosis/severity level, plus a “warranty factor” to cover adverse events. The 
warranty factor would be computed as the current lowest rate of adverse events for 
that diagnosis/severity combination among providers times the estimated average 
cost of treating the adverse events. 
• The ECP would include the estimated costs of services by all providers involved in 
the episode of care, along with a standard allocation of the payment to individual 
providers based on the proportion of the overall cost attributable to each provider. 
 
Defining the Actual Base Payment Amount 
• Providers or groups of providers would define and announce their actual ECP or 
portion of an ECP (i.e., their “price”) for a particular diagnosis/severity 
combination as a percentage of the suggested ECP. Providers could charge 
different amounts to different payers, including individuals self-paying for care. 
• Groups of providers could agree to share the ECP in any way they wished, either 
based on the standard allocation or a different allocation (e.g., based on cost savings 
achieved beyond the estimated costs of care). In the absence of such an agreement, 
the payer would pay each provider a standard allocation of the ECP times the 
provider’s percentage discount/premium. 
 
Conditions for Receiving the Base Payment Amount 
• Patients would be entered into a regional registry so that outcomes could be 
tracked for purposes of measuring performance. 
• Retroactive adjustments to payments would be made for cases where all 
mandatory care elements of the Clinical Practice Guideline for patients of that 
diagnosis/severity had not been provided, unless certification were given by an 
appropriate physician that the excluded elements of care were contraindicated in 
that patient’s case or that the patient was participating in a clinical trial. 
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 • Providers would not be paid for additional episodes of care nor otherwise be paid 
extra for care needed to address preventable adverse events or the complications 
resulting from such events. 
• Providers would be required to accept all patients in a particular diagnosis/severity 
combination from a particular payer in order to accept any patients of that type. 
 
Adjustments to the Base Payment Amount 
• The recommended ECP amount would be adjusted periodically in response to 
updates in Clinical Practice Guidelines, the discounts offered by providers, new 
technologies, inflation, etc. 
• Providers would be permitted to revise their actual ECP rates upward at most 
yearly, but would be encouraged to revise them downward whenever possible. 
• No adjustment in payment would be made for patients requiring significantly 
more services or costs than were assumed in computing the base payment level, 
but the outlier cases would be documented and used to adjust the diagnosis and 
severity categories and/or future base payment levels in the next year. 
• Payers in a region would contribute funding to a pool on a formula basis for the 
purpose of making additional payments to teaching hospitals to cover the 
additional costs of medical education. 
 
Performance Measurement and Incentives 
• The providers of services under the ECP would report publicly on the outcomes 
they achieve for patients paid for under that ECP and on their level of compliance 
with non-mandatory processes under the Clinical Practice Guideline. 
 
Encouraging Patients to Promote Quality and Cost Containment 
• Payers would refuse to pay for care at the lowest-quality, highest-cost providers 
except under emergency circumstances. Patients choosing to use those providers, 
except in an emergency, would be liable to pay the full costs of care. 
• Patients using the highest-quality, lowest-cost providers would have a significantly 
reduced copayment amount and/or receive financial rebates. 
• Patients would receive financial rebates from the payer for compliance with care 
processes recommended by the provider. 
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 B. Creating a Value-Based Payment System for Care of Chronic Conditions 
This section focuses on how payers should pay for care of chronic conditions, i.e., conditions 
such as diabetes, hypertension, heart failure, asthma, etc. (see Section II-C). 
 
There is growing agreement that people with chronic conditions require a 
different type of care than is typically associated with the major acute episode discussed in 
Subsection VI-A. However, even within the broad category of chronic conditions, there 
are very different categories of patients requiring different types of care (see Section II-C). 
How care of this broad range of patients should be paid for is the subject of this subsection. 
 
This section is divided into nine different issues in five categories that need to be 
addressed in order to achieve the goals proposed in the previous section: 
 
Basic Payment Method 
2.1 What basic payment method should be used to pay providers for care of 
chronic conditions? 
 
Bundling of Payment 
2.2 Should payments to medical care managers and other providers providing care 
related to chronic conditions be bundled together into a single payment to one 
accountable provider? 
 
Payment Levels 
2.3 If a fee-for-service payment system is used, how should the fee levels be determined? 
2.4 If a care management payment (CMP) system is used, how should the base 
payment level be determined? 
2.5 Should payment levels be adjusted for “outlier” cases? 
 
Performance Standards 
2.6 What level of service or performance should be required in order to receive the 
base payment level? 
2.7 Should financial incentives beyond the basic payment level be provided for 
differences in performance? 
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 Patient Incentives 
2.8 How should patients be encouraged to choose high-quality/low-cost providers? 
2.9 How should patients be encouraged or assisted to adhere to care processes that 
affect outcomes or costs? 
 
Ways that the payments defined in this section might be modified at the margin to 
reward or penalize varying levels of performance will be discussed separately, in Section VII. 
 
For each issue, options for resolution are suggested. In most cases, there are many 
potential options for addressing an issue; an attempt has been made to identify options that 
differ along major conceptual dimensions, but the specifics of individual options will likely 
need to be modified or enhanced in order to insure that specific goals and concerns are 
addressed. In addition, options for a particular issue may not be mutually exclusive. 
 
1. Key Issues and Options 
Issue 2.1: What basic payment method should be used for care of 
chronic conditions? 
Option 2.1.1: For care of chronic conditions, the patient’s primary care physician 
should be paid on a fee-for-service basis. Fees for care management 
services should (1) be sufficient to cover time spent counseling 
patients and conducting compliance monitoring/encouragement, 
(2) not be restricted to services provided by a physician in a face-to-
face visit, and (3) allow multiple services to be provided on the 
same day/in the same visit. Other providers should also be paid on 
a fee-for-service basis, except for major acute episodes associated 
with the chronic condition, which would be paid as specified in 
Section VI-A. 
Option 2.1.2: For care of chronic conditions, a medical care manager should be 
paid a single, periodic, prospectively defined Care Management 
Payment (CMP) to cover all of the care management services associated 
with that chronic condition, with the amount adjusted for the 
severity/risk of the patient. The medical care manager or other providers 
should be paid separately for preventive care and care of minor acute episodes 
provided beyond basic care management. Major acute episodes and long-term 
care associated with the chronic condition would be paid separately. 
The medical care manager could be a physician or a practice staffed 
by a team of health care professionals. 
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 The American College of Physicians (ACP) has proposed an 
“advanced medical home” model, in which patients have a personal 
physician working with a team of health care professionals. 
According to ACP, for most patients the personal physician would 
most appropriately be a primary care physician, but it could be a 
specialist or sub-specialist for patients requiring ongoing care for 
certain conditions, e.g., severe asthma, complex diabetes, 
complicated cardiovascular disease, rheumatologic disorders, and 
malignancies. In the ACP model, rather than being a “gatekeeper” 
who restricts patient access to services, the personal physician would 
coordinate and facilitate the patient’s care by using evidence-based 
medicine and clinical decision support tools, by creating an 
integrated, coherent plan for ongoing medical care in partnership 
with the patient and their families, by providing enhanced and 
convenient access to care not only through face-to-face visits but 
also via telephone, e-mail, and other modes of communication, by 
identifying and measuring key quality indicators to demonstrate 
continuous improvement in health status indicators for individuals 
and populations treated, and by adopting and implementing the use 
of health information technology to promote quality of care, to 
establish a safe environment in which to receive care, to protect the 
security of health information, and to promote the provision of 
health information exchange. 
Option 2.1.3: For care of chronic conditions, a medical care manager should be 
paid a single, periodic, prospectively defined care management 
payment (CMP) to cover all of the care management, preventive care, 
and minor acute care services associated with that chronic condition, 
with the amount adjusted for the severity/risk of the patient. Major 
acute episodes and long-term care associated with the chronic condition would 
be paid separately. 
Option 2.1.4: For care of chronic conditions, a medical care manager should be 
paid a single, periodic, prospectively defined CMP to cover all of the 
care associated with that chronic condition, including preventive care, 
minor acute care, and any major acute episodes, with the amount 
adjusted for the severity/risk of the patient. Long-term care associated 
with the chronic condition would be paid separately. 
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 Option 2.1.5: For care of chronic conditions, a medical care manager should be 
paid a single, periodic, prospectively defined CMP to cover all of the 
care associated with that chronic condition, including preventive care, 
minor acute care, any major acute episodes, and any long-term care services 
(e.g., nursing home or home health care), with the amount adjusted for 
the severity/risk of the patient. 
 
Issue 2.2: Should payments to medical care managers and other 
providers supplying care related to chronic conditions 
be bundled together into a single payment to one 
accountable provider? 
Currently, most payment systems are designed to pay each provider 
separately for the services they provide. A “bundled” payment 
means that a single payment is defined to cover the services of two 
or more providers. 
Option 2.2.1: For care of chronic conditions, separate payments should be defined 
and made to the medical care manager and any other providers 
involved in supplying the types of care defined in Issue 2.1. 
Option 2.2.2: For care of chronic conditions, a single payment should be defined 
and paid to the medical care manager for the services of all physicians, 
medical practices, and diagnostic services involved in providing the types 
of care defined in Issue 2.1. 
Option 2.2.3: For care of chronic conditions, a single payment should be defined 
and paid to the medical care manager for the services of all other 
providers involved in supplying the types of care defined in Issue 2.1. 
For example, under Option 2.2.2, the medical care manager could be 
paid a single payment to cover the costs of both services provided 
directly by the medical care manager and by diagnostic laboratories, etc. 
Under Option 2.2.3, for a patient requiring long-term care services 
(whether in a nursing home or in a community setting with home 
health care), a single payment would be defined to cover the costs 
of physician care, long-term care, and any hospitalizations. 
 
Issue 2.3: If a fee-for-service system is used, how should the fee levels 
be determined? 
Option 2.3.1: Fee levels should be based on the current Resource-Based Relative 
Value Scale (RBRVS) used by Medicare, but the relative values for 
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 care management services should be increased significantly to reflect 
the need for more intensive patient management services for 
persons with chronic conditions. 
Option 2.3.2: A national, state, or regional public–private collaborative (with 
representation from both payers and providers) should determine 
proposed fee levels for care management services. Fee levels for 
other services should be based on the current RBRVS used by 
Medicare. Individual providers could propose fee levels above or 
below the proposed level. 
 
Issue 2.4: If a care management payment (CMP) system is used, how 
should the base payment level be determined? 
Option 2.4.1: For each combination of diagnosis and patient severity for which a 
separate CMP will be made, providers should propose the amount of 
payment (i.e. their “price” for the management of care). 
Option 2.4.2: For each combination of diagnosis and patient severity for which a 
separate CMP will be made, a national, state, or regional public–private 
collaborative (with representation from both payers and providers) should 
define a recommended set of best-practice services to be covered by the CMP 
and, where data are available, estimate the current cost for that set of services. 
Actual CMP levels would be determined through negotiations between 
providers and payers. 
Option 2.4.3: For each combination of diagnosis and patient severity for which a 
separate CMP will be made, a national, state, or regional public–private 
collaborative (with representation from both payers and providers) should 
determine a recommended payment level based on a study to estimate 
the cost of delivering good quality care for that category of 
diagnosis and severity (i.e., a “suggested price” for the management 
of care). Providers should either accept the recommended payment level, or 
propose a discount below (or premium above) the payment level that they 
will accept (i.e., their “price” for the management of care) for 
patients in that category. 
For example, Allan Goroll and colleagues have proposed calculating 
a payment level for primary care providers based on a budget 
reasonably expected to cover the personnel and operating expenses 
for a primary care practice, divided by the number of patients of a 
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 particular need/risk level the practice could be expected to manage. 
(See “Fundamental Reform of Payment for Adult Primary Care: 
Comprehensive Payment for Comprehensive Care,” by Allan H. 
Goroll, Robert A. Berenson, Stephen C. Schoenbaum, and 
Laurence B. Gardner, Journal of General Internal Medicine, 2007.) 
Options 2.4.1, 2.4.2, and 2.4.3 are each consistent with either a 
bidding model or a negotiation model of pricing; in each case, the 
provider proposes a price and the payer would either accept or 
reject the price. Options 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 would introduce a 
“starting point” for bidding or negotiations through the 
recommended payment level. 
Option 2.4.4: For each combination of diagnosis and patient severity for which a 
separate CMP will be made, a national, state, or regional public–private 
collaborative (with representation from both payers and providers) should 
determine a payment level based on a study to estimate the cost of 
delivering good quality care for that combination of diagnosis and 
severity. Providers should accept the payment level as payment in full for 
the care provided to patients in that category. 
Establishing a uniform payment level across all providers and payers 
will likely raise anti-trust concerns. A special ruling from the U.S. 
attorney general and state attorney(s) general, or legislation, may be 
needed to provide a safe harbor for such a pricing approach if 
appropriate benefits can be demonstrated. 
 
Issue 2.5: Should payment levels be adjusted for “outlier” cases? 
“Outlier” cases are patients for whom the level of services or costs 
associated with quality care is significantly higher than for other 
patients with the same diagnosis and ostensibly the same severity 
level. Fee-for-service and per diem payments inherently 
compensate providers more for this additional care, but a CMP 
system would not, without explicit provisions to do so. 
Option 2.5.1: When a provider documents that its total cost of caring for a patient 
exceeds a certain multiple of the base payment level for that category of 
patient (based on diagnosis and severity), the provider should 
receive an additional payment to cover a portion of those costs. 
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 Option 2.5.2: When a provider documents that it was required to provide services 
significantly beyond the level assumed in computing the base payment level, 
the provider should receive an additional payment to cover a portion of 
the documented out-of-pocket costs associated with the additional care. 
The distinction between Option 2.5.1 and Option 2.5.2 is that in 
the latter, the provider documents services performed beyond the 
normally expected level of services, whereas in the former, the 
provider documents costs beyond the normally expected level of 
costs. Also, in the latter, the outlier payment is based on out-of-
pocket costs (e.g., medications, etc.) rather than total costs (e.g., 
allocations of overhead, salaries, etc.). 
Option 2.5.3: No adjustment in payment should be made for patients requiring 
significantly more services than were assumed in computing the 
base payment level, but such outlier cases should be documented 
and used by the payer and provider to adjust the diagnosis/severity 
categories (e.g., by adding a new severity level) and/or to adjust 
future base payment levels. 
Failure to provide any adjustment could violate Goal 4, by 
encouraging providers to avoid patients with unusually high care needs 
that are not effectively captured in the severity adjustment system. 
 
Issue 2.6: What level of service or performance should be required in 
order to receive the base payment level? 
Because of concerns that many patients are not receiving elements 
of care that have been determined to be appropriate or necessary, 
most current pay-for-performance systems have an explicit or 
implicit goal of encouraging, but not mandating, that providers reach 
100% compliance with certain processes that have been 
demonstrated to improve patient outcomes. However, an 
alternative approach would be to define processes where 100% 
compliance is considered essential (except where they are clearly 
contraindicated or where the patient is participating in a clinical 
trial explicitly to test new processes) and to require that those 
processes be performed in order to receive payment. 
Option 2.6.1: Payers and/or a public–private collaborative (involving both payers 
and providers) should define those structures for care management 
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 that are considered mandatory for patients in a particular age/severity 
category in order for a provider to receive CMP payments. 
For example, providers might be required to have data systems and 
staffing levels adequate to support regular monitoring and follow-up 
of patients with chronic conditions. 
Option 2.6.2: Payers and/or a public–private collaborative (involving both payers 
and providers) should define those processes that are considered 
mandatory for patients in a particular age/severity category (either 
as part of an existing Clinical Practice Guideline, where one exists, 
or separately), and providers should only be paid if those processes 
are delivered, unless there is clear documentation that the processes 
are contra-indicated for the patient or if the patient is participating 
in a formal clinical trial of alternative processes. 
Option 2.6.3: No mandatory processes should be established in order for providers 
to receive payment. 
 
Issue 2.7: Should financial incentives beyond the basic payment level 
be provided for differences in performance? 
Option 2.7.1: Specific financial incentives should not be granted to providers; instead, 
comparative information for payers and patients on performance levels 
and prices should be used to drive improvements in performance. 
Option 2.7.2: Specific financial incentives should be granted for those aspects of care 
for which the payment system provides inadequate incentives or 
undesirable disincentives. 
Section II-B discusses the areas where incentives may be needed. 
The detailed issues and options for how to implement specific 
financial incentive programs are discussed in Section VII. 
 
Issue 2.8: How should patients be encouraged to choose high 
quality/low-cost providers? 
Option 2.8.1: Patients should be given complete discretion to choose providers, using 
available information on quality and cost of providers as they wish. 
Option 2.8.2: Payers should give patients financial incentives (e.g., lower copays or 
co-insurance amounts) for using providers with higher quality 
and/or lower cost. 
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 Option 2.8.3: Payers should give patients financial disincentives (e.g., higher copays 
or co-insurance amounts) for using providers with lower quality 
and/or higher cost. 
Option 2.8.4: Payers should refuse to pay for care by the lowest quality and highest 
cost providers. 
 
Issue 2.9: How should patients be encouraged or assisted to adhere to 
care processes that affect outcomes or costs? 
Option 2.9.1: Payers should provide financial incentives to patients (e.g., bonuses 
or reduced copays) for adherence with care processes recommended 
or required by their health care provider. 
Option 2.9.2: Payers should provide financial incentives to providers based on the 
level of patient involvement in care planning and/or patient 
adherence with care processes. 
Option 2.9.3: Providers should give financial incentives to patients (e.g., bonuses or 
reduced copays) for adherence with care processes recommended or 
required by the provider. 
Option 2.9.4: Providers should establish proactive systems for educating, monitoring, and 
encouraging patient engagement with treatment processes. Payers should then 
provide incentives to patients (financial and non-financial) for adherence 
with care processes co-developed by patients and providers. 
Option 2.9.5: Providers should establish proactive systems for educating, monitoring, 
and encouraging patient adherence, but no explicit financial incentives 
should be provided to patients. 
 
2. Example of a Possible Payment System for Care of Chronic Conditions 
The following is just one example of how the options from the issues described above 
could be combined into a new method of payment for care of chronic conditions. 
 
Method of Payment 
• A single provider would be designated as the medical care manager for a patient 
with a chronic condition and be paid a single, periodic, prospectively defined care 
management payment (CMP) to cover all of the care management, preventive care, 
and minor acute care services associated with that chronic condition, with the amount 
adjusted for the severity/risk of the patient. All providers and all costs associated 
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 with this care would be covered by the single payment. Major acute episodes and 
long-term care associated with the chronic condition would be paid separately. 
 
Defining a Recommended Base Payment Amount 
• A recommended CMP amount would be established by a regional public-private 
collaborative (involving both payers and providers) for each combination of a 
diagnosis and patient severity level. 
• The recommended CMP amount would be based on the estimated cost of 
delivering the care management, prevention, and minor acute care elements of the 
Clinical Practice Guidelines for that diagnosis/severity level (where one exists). 
• The CMP would include the estimated costs of services by all providers involved 
in the episode of care. 
 
Defining the Actual Base Payment Amount 
• Providers or groups of providers would define and announce their actual CMP 
(i.e., their “price”) for patients in each diagnosis/severity level as a percentage of 
the recommended CMP. Providers could charge different amounts to different 
payers, including individuals self-paying for care. 
• Groups of providers could agree to share the CMP in any way they wished. 
 
Conditions for Receiving the Base Payment Amount 
• Patients would be entered into a regional registry so that outcomes could be 
tracked for purposes of measuring performance. 
• The CMP would be made on a monthly basis to the provider serving as the 
patient’s medical care manager in order to provide or coordinate the provision of 
all routine and preventive care associated with the diagnosed condition. 
• Retroactive adjustments to payments would be made for cases where all 
mandatory care elements of the Clinical Practice Guideline for patients of that 
diagnosis/severity had not been provided, unless an appropriate physician certifies 
that the excluded elements of care were contraindicated in that patient’s case or 
that the patient was participating in a clinical trial. 
• Payment would not depend on which provider or health care professional 
provided the care (as long as the professional was licensed to do so), or when or 
where the care was provided (e.g., in one office visit, multiple office visits, in the 
home, etc.). 
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 Adjustments to the Base Payment Amount 
• The recommended CMP amount would be adjusted periodically in response to 
updates in Clinical Practice Guidelines, the discounts offered by providers, new 
technologies, inflation, etc. 
• Providers would be permitted to revise their actual CMP rates upward at most 
yearly, but would be encouraged to revise them downward whenever possible. 
• No adjustment in payment would be made for patients requiring significantly 
more services or costs than were assumed in computing the base payment level, 
but the outlier cases would be documented and used to adjust the diagnosis and 
severity categories and/or future base payment levels in the next year. 
 
Performance Measurement and Incentives 
• The medical care manager would report publicly and receive a bonus payment 
based on the level of outcomes for patients paid for under the CMP and/or the 
level of provider compliance with non-mandatory processes under the Clinical 
Practice Guideline. One of the outcomes would be the number and severity of 
major acute episodes for the patients being managed by the medical care manager. 
• The amount of the bonus would be based on a portion of the present value of 
avoided costs associated with the improved outcomes or process compliance. (For 
example, if the number of major acute episodes for patients declined, then the 
bonus payment would be based on a portion of the estimated cost of the avoided 
ECP payments.) 
 
Encouraging Patients to Promote Quality and Cost Containment 
• Patients using the highest-quality, lowest-cost providers would have a reduced 
copayment amount. 
• Patients would also receive a financial reward based on adherence with both 
processes and outcomes (e.g., stopping smoking, getting immunizations, lowering 
cholesterol level) recommended by their medical care manager. 
 
C. Creating a Value-Based Payment System for Care of Minor Acute Episodes 
This section focuses on how payers should pay for care of minor acute episodes, i.e., minor 
wounds, normal childbirth, minor respiratory diseases, etc. (see Section II-C). Some 
conditions may be self-limiting or may not even require treatment, but some may be the 
early manifestation of something more serious or potentially more serious. This excludes 
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 exacerbations of a condition that result in a major acute care episode, which are addressed 
in Section VI-A. 
 
This section is divided into nine different issues in five categories that need to be 
addressed in order to achieve the goals proposed in Section V: 
 
Basic Payment Method 
3.1 What basic payment method should be used to pay providers for care of minor 
acute episodes? 
 
Bundling of Payment 
3.2 Should payments to all providers for minor acute episodes be bundled together 
into a single payment? 
 
Payment Levels 
3.3 If a fee-for-service payment or an episode of care payment is used, how should the 
base payment level be determined? 
3.4 If a care management payment system is used, how should the base payment level 
be determined? 
 
Performance Standards 
3.5 What level of service or performance should be required in order to receive the 
base payment level? 
3.6 How should payments be changed when preventable adverse events (errors, 
infections, etc.) occur? 
3.7 Should financial incentives beyond the basic payment level be provided for 
differences in performance? 
 
Patient Incentives 
3.8 How should patients be encouraged to choose high-quality/low-cost providers? 
3.9 How should patients be encouraged or assisted to adhere to care processes that 
affect outcomes or costs? 
 
Ways that the payments defined in this section might be modified at the margin to 
reward or penalize varying levels of performance will be discussed separately, in Section VII. 
 53
 For each issue, options for resolution are suggested. In most cases, there are many 
potential options for addressing an issue; an attempt has been made to identify options that 
differ along major conceptual dimensions, but the specifics of individual options will likely 
need to be modified or enhanced in order to insure that specific goals and concerns are 
addressed. In addition, options for a particular issue may not be mutually exclusive. 
 
1. Key Issues and Options 
Issue 3.1: What basic payment method should be used for care of 
minor acute episodes? 
Option 3.1.1: For care of minor acute episodes, any licensed provider should be 
paid on a fee-for-service basis to provide care for the condition. 
Option 3.1.2: For minor acute episodes, a single prospectively defined episode of 
care payment (ECP) should be made to cover all of a provider’s 
services associated with that episode of care, with the amount 
adjusted for the severity/risk of the patient where there is likely to 
be a significant difference in cost. 
Option 3.1.3: A single prospectively defined care management payment (CMP) 
should be paid to a primary care provider to cover all minor acute 
care given to all of the patients cared for by that provider, with the 
amount adjusted for the severity/risk of the patients cared for by 
that provider. 
 
Issue 3.2: Should payments to all providers for minor acute episodes 
be bundled together into a single payment? 
Currently, most payment systems are designed to pay each provider 
separately for the services they provide. A “bundled” payment means 
that a single payment is defined to cover the services of two or more 
providers, with a goal of aligning incentives for all of the providers. 
Option 3.2.1: For minor acute episodes, separate payments should be defined and 
made to different providers involved with the care. 
Option 3.2.2: For minor acute episodes, a single payment should be defined and 
paid to a primary care provider to cover the costs of all of the 
physicians, physician practices, and diagnostic services associated with the 
episode of care. 
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 Option 3.2.3: For minor acute episodes, a single payment should be defined and 
paid to a primary care provider to cover the costs of all providers 
associated with the episode of care. 
 
Issue 3.3: If a fee-for-service payment or an episode-of-care payment 
is used, how should the base payment level be determined? 
Option 3.3.1: For each service for which a separate fee will be paid, or for each 
combination of diagnosis and patient severity for which a separate 
episode-of-care payment will be made, providers should propose the 
amount of payment (i.e. their “price” for the service or episode of care). 
Option 3.3.2: For each service for which a separate fee will be paid, or for each 
combination of diagnosis and patient severity for which a separate 
episode-of-care payment will be made, a national, state, or regional 
public–private collaborative (with representation from both payers and 
providers) should determine a recommended payment level based on a 
study to estimate the cost of delivering good quality care for that 
service or for that category of diagnosis and severity (i.e., a 
“suggested price” for the service or episode of care). Providers would 
either accept the recommended payment level, or propose a discount below 
(or premium above) the payment level that they will accept (i.e., their 
“price” for the service or episode of care) for that category of 
patient. Proposed base payment levels should differ from region to 
region based on the differences in cost-of-living by region, but 
providers should capture detailed cost differences in their 
discounts/premiums over the standard payment rate. 
Options 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 are both consistent with either a bidding 
model or a negotiation model of pricing; in each case, the provider 
proposes a price and the payer would either accept or reject the 
price. Option 3.3.2 would introduce a “starting point” for bidding 
or negotiations through the recommended payment level. 
Option 3.3.3: For each service for which a separate fee will be paid, or for each 
combination of diagnosis and patient severity for which a separate 
episode-of-care payment will be made, a national, state, or regional 
public–private collaborative (with representation from both payers and 
providers) should determine a payment level based on a study to estimate 
the cost of delivering good quality care for that service or for that 
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 combination of diagnosis and severity. Base payment levels should 
differ from region to region based on the differences in cost of 
living by region. Providers should accept the payment level as payment in 
full for the care provided to patients in that category. 
Establishing a uniform payment level across all providers and payers 
in a region will likely raise anti-trust concerns. A special ruling from 
the U.S. attorney general and state attorney(s) general, or legislation, 
may be needed to provide a safe harbor for such a pricing approach 
if appropriate benefits can be demonstrated. 
 
Issue 3.4: If a care management payment system is used, how should 
the base payment level be determined? 
Option 3.4.1: For any particular mix of severity/risk for the patient population 
being served, providers should propose the amount of payment (i.e., their 
“price” for the management of care). 
Option 3.4.2: For any particular mix of severity/risk for the patient population 
being served, a national, state, or regional public–private collaborative 
(with representation from both payers and providers) should determine a 
recommended payment level based on a study to estimate the cost of 
delivering good quality care for patients with that mix of risk/severity 
(i.e., a “suggested price” for the management of care). Providers 
should either accept the recommended payment level, or propose a discount 
below (or premium above) the payment level that they will accept (i.e., their 
“price” for the management of care) for patients with that mix. 
Option 3.4.3: For any particular mix of severity/risk for the patient population 
being served, a national, state, or regional public–private collaborative 
(with representation from both payers and providers) should determine a 
payment level based on a study to estimate the cost of delivering 
good quality care for patients with that mix of risk/severity. Providers 
should accept the payment level as payment in full for the care provided to 
patients with that mix. 
As with the previous issue, establishing a uniform payment level across 
all providers and payers in a region will likely raise anti-trust concerns. 
A special ruling from the U.S. attorney general and state attorney(s) 
general, or legislation, may be needed to provide a safe harbor for 
such a pricing approach if appropriate benefits can be demonstrated. 
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 Issue 3.5: What level of service or performance should be required in 
order to receive the base payment level? 
Because of concerns that many patients are not receiving elements 
of care that have been determined to be appropriate or necessary, 
most current pay-for-performance systems have an explicit or 
implicit goal of encouraging, but not mandating, that providers reach 
100% compliance with certain processes that have been 
demonstrated to improve patient outcomes. However, an 
alternative approach would be to define processes where 100% 
compliance is considered essential (except where they are clearly 
contraindicated or where the patient is participating in a clinical 
trial explicitly to test new processes) and to require that those 
processes be performed in order to receive payment. 
Option 3.5.1: Payers and/or a public–private collaborative (involving both payers 
and providers) should define those processes that are considered 
mandatory for patients in a particular diagnosis/severity category, 
and providers should be paid only if those processes are delivered, 
unless there is clear documentation that the processes are 
contraindicated for the patient or if the patient is participating in a 
formal clinical trial of alternative processes. 
Option 3.5.2: No mandatory processes should be established in order for 
providers to receive payment. 
 
Issue 3.6: How should payments be changed when preventable 
adverse events (errors, infections, etc.) occur? 
Option 3.6.1: Providers should not be paid more for care needed to address preventable 
adverse events or the complications resulting from such events. 
Option 3.6.2: Providers should be paid for care needed to address preventable 
adverse events, but payment bonuses or penalties should be provided 
based on the rates of preventable adverse events. 
 
Issue 3.7: Should financial incentives beyond the basic payment level 
be provided for differences in performance? 
Option 3.7.1: Specific financial incentives should not be granted to providers; instead, 
comparative information for payers and patients on performance levels 
and prices should be used to drive improvements in performance. 
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 Option 3.7.2: Specific financial incentives should be granted for those aspects of care 
for which the payment system provides inadequate incentives or 
undesirable disincentives. 
Section II-B discusses the areas where incentives may be needed. 
The detailed issues and options for how to implement specific 
financial incentive programs are discussed in Section VII. 
 
Issue 3.8: How should patients be encouraged to choose high-
quality/low-cost providers? 
Option 3.8.1: Patients should be given complete discretion to choose providers, using 
available information on quality and cost of providers as they wish. 
Option 3.8.2: Payers should give patients financial incentives (e.g., lower copays or 
co-insurance amounts) for using providers with higher quality 
and/or lower cost. 
Option 3.8.3: Payers should give patients financial disincentives (e.g., higher copays 
or co-insurance amounts) for using providers with lower quality 
and/or higher cost. 
Option 3.8.4: Payers should refuse to pay for care by the lowest quality and highest 
cost providers. 
 
Issue 3.9: How should patients be encouraged or assisted to adhere to 
care processes that affect outcomes or costs? 
Option 3.9.1: Payers should give financial incentives to patients (e.g., bonuses or 
reduced copays) for adherence with care processes required or 
recommended by their health care provider. 
Option 3.9.2: Payers should provide financial incentives to providers based on the 
level of patient involvement in care planning and/or patient 
adherence with care processes. 
Option 3.9.3: Providers should give financial incentives to patients (e.g., bonuses or 
reduced copays) for adherence with care processes required or 
recommended by the provider. 
Option 3.9.4: Providers should establish proactive systems for educating, monitoring, 
and encouraging patient adherence, but no explicit financial incentives 
should be provided to patients. 
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 2. Example of a Possible Payment System for Care of Minor Acute Episodes 
The following is just one example of how the options from the issues described above 
could be combined into a new method of payment for care of minor acute episodes. 
 
Method of Payment 
• A single prospectively defined episode-of-care payment (ECP) would be made to 
cover all of a provider’s services associated with an episode of care for minor acute 
episodes, with the amount adjusted for the severity/risk of the patient where there 
is likely to be a significant difference in cost. All providers (hospitals, physicians, 
home health care agencies, etc.) and all costs (e.g., drugs and medical devices) 
involved in the episode of care would be paid from this single payment. 
 
Defining a Recommended Base Payment Amount 
• For those minor acute episodes for which a Clinical Practice Guideline has been 
established, a recommended ECP amount would be established by a regional 
public-private collaborative (involving both payers and providers) for each 
combination of a diagnosis and patient severity level. 
• The recommended ECP amount would be based on the estimated cost of 
delivering all elements of the Clinical Practice Guideline for that diagnosis/severity 
level, plus a “warranty factor” to cover adverse events. The warranty factor would 
be computed as the current lowest rate of adverse events for that diagnosis/severity 
combination times the estimated average cost of treating the adverse events. 
• The ECP would include the estimated costs of services by all providers involved in 
the episode of care, along with a standard allocation of the payment to individual 
providers based on the proportion of the overall cost attributable to each provider. 
 
Defining the Actual Base Payment Amount 
• Providers or groups of providers would define and announce their actual ECP or 
portion of an ECP (i.e., their “price”) for a particular diagnosis/severity 
combination as a percentage of the suggested ECP. Providers could charge 
different amounts to different payers, including individuals self-paying for care. 
• Where no suggested ECP had been established, providers would propose fee levels 
for their services. 
• Groups of providers could agree to share the ECP in any way they wished, either 
based on the standard allocation or a different allocation (e.g., based on cost savings 
achieved beyond the estimated costs of care). In the absence of such an agreement, 
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 the payer would pay each provider a standard allocation of the ECP times the 
provider’s percentage discount/premium. 
 
Conditions for Receiving the Base Payment Amount 
• Patients would be entered into a regional registry so that outcomes could be 
tracked for purposes of measuring performance. 
• Retroactive adjustments to payments would be made for cases where all 
mandatory care elements of the Clinical Practice Guideline for patients of that 
diagnosis/severity had not been provided, unless an appropriate physician certified 
that the excluded elements of care were contraindicated in that patient’s case or 
that the patient was participating in a clinical trial. 
• Providers would not be paid for additional episodes of care nor otherwise be paid 
extra for care needed to address preventable adverse events or the complications 
resulting from such events. 
 
Adjustments to the Base Payment Amount 
• The recommended ECP amount would be adjusted periodically in response to 
updates in Clinical Practice Guidelines, the discounts offered by providers, new 
technologies, inflation, etc. 
• Providers would be permitted to revise their actual ECP rates upward at most 
yearly, but would be encouraged to revise them downward whenever possible. 
• No adjustment in payment would be made for patients requiring significantly 
more services or costs than were assumed in computing the base payment level, 
but the outlier cases would be documented and used to adjust the diagnosis and 
severity categories and/or future base payment levels in the next year. 
 
Performance Measurement and Incentives 
• The providers of services under the ECP would report publicly on the outcomes 
they achieve for patients paid for under that ECP and on their level of compliance 
with non-mandatory processes under the Clinical Practice Guideline. 
 
Encouraging Patients to Promote Quality and Cost Containment 
• Payers would refuse to pay for care at the lowest-quality, highest-cost providers 
except under emergency circumstances. Patients choosing to use those providers, 
except in an emergency, would be liable to pay the full costs of care. 
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 • Patients using the highest-quality, lowest-cost providers would have a significantly 
reduced copayment amount and/or receive financial rebates. 
• Patients would receive financial rebates from the payer for compliance with care 
processes recommended by the provider. 
 
D. Creating a Value-Based Payment System for Preventive Care 
This section focuses on how payers should pay for preventive care, i.e., immunizations, 
screening tests, counseling, etc., designed to prevent chronic conditions and some acute 
episodes (see Section II-C). 
 
This section is divided into seven different issues in five categories that need to be 
addressed in order to achieve the goals proposed in the previous section: 
 
Basic Payment Method 
4.1 What basic payment method should be used to pay providers for preventive care? 
 
Bundling of Payment 
4.2 Should payments to all providers for preventive care be bundled together into a 
single payment? 
 
Payment Levels 
4.3 How should the base payment level for a preventive care management payment 
(CMP) be determined? 
 
Performance Standards 
4.4 What level of service or performance should be required in order to receive the 
base payment level? 
4.5 Should financial incentives beyond the basic payment level be provided for 
differences in performance? 
 
Patient Incentives 
4.6 How should patients be encouraged to choose high-quality/low-cost providers? 
4.7 How should patients be encouraged or assisted to adhere to care processes that 
affect outcomes or costs? 
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 Ways that the payments defined in this section might be modified at the margin to 
reward or penalize varying levels of performance will be discussed separately, in Section VII. 
 
For each issue, options for resolution are suggested. In most cases, there are many 
potential options for addressing an issue; an attempt has been made to identify options that 
differ along major conceptual dimensions, but the specifics of individual options will likely 
need to be modified or enhanced in order to insure that specific goals and concerns are 
addressed. In addition, options for a particular issue may not be mutually exclusive. 
 
1. Key Issues and Options 
Issue 4.1: What basic payment method should be used for preventive care? 
Option 4.1.1: For preventive care, any licensed provider should be paid on a fee-
for-service basis for preventive care services. Fees should (1) be sufficient 
to cover time spent counseling patients and conducting compliance 
monitoring/encouragement, (2) not be restricted to services 
provided by a physician in a face-to-face visit, and (3) allow 
multiple services to be provided on the same day/in the same visit. 
Option 4.1.2: For preventive care, a preventive care manager should be paid a 
periodic, prospectively defined preventive Care Management 
Payment (CMP) to cover a full range of preventive care services for an 
individual patient, with the amount adjusted for the age/risk of the 
patient. In addition, the medical care manager should be paid on a 
fee-for-service basis for actual preventive services provided beyond 
basic care management (e.g., immunizations). These payments 
would not be expected to cover either minor or major acute episodes, or 
prevention associated with management of a chronic condition, which would 
be covered under other payment systems. 
Option 4.1.3: For preventive care, a preventive care manager should be paid a 
periodic, prospectively defined preventive CMP to cover a full range 
of preventive care services for an individual patient, with the amount 
adjusted for the age/risk of the patient. This payment would also be 
expected to cover all minor acute episodes, but not major acute episodes or 
services associated with management of a chronic condition, which would be 
covered under other payment systems. 
Option 4.1.4: For preventive care, a preventive care manager should be paid a 
periodic, prospectively defined preventive CMP to cover a specific 
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 set of preventive care services for a group of individuals, with the amount 
adjusted for the characteristics of the group. The group of individuals 
might be defined geographically (e.g., a particular neighborhood or 
residential building) or by demographic group (e.g., senior citizens 
or teenagers). 
 
Issue 4.2: Should payments to all providers for preventive care be 
bundled together into a single payment? 
Currently, most payment systems are designed to pay each provider 
separately for the services they provide. A “bundled” payment means 
that a single payment is defined to cover the services of two or more 
providers, with a goal of aligning incentives for all of the providers. 
Option 4.2.1: For preventive care, separate payments should be defined and made 
to different providers involved with the care. 
Option 4.2.2: For preventive care, a single payment should be defined and paid to 
an accountable primary care provider to cover the costs of all of the 
providers involved with the preventive care. 
 
Issue 4.3: How should the base payment level for a preventive care 
management payment (CMP) be determined? 
Option 4.3.1: For each combination of patient age/risk for which a separate preventive 
care management payment will be made, providers should propose the 
amount of payment (i.e., their “price” for the management of care). 
Option 4.3.2: For each combination of patient age/risk for which a separate 
preventive care management payment will be made, a national, state, 
or regional public–private collaborative (with representation from both payers 
and providers) should determine a recommended payment level based on a 
study to estimate the cost of delivering good quality care for that 
type of patient (i.e., a “suggested price” for the management of 
care). Providers should either accept the recommended payment level, or 
propose a discount below (or premium above) the payment level that they 
will accept (i.e., their “price” for the management of care) for 
patients in that category. 
For example, Allan Goroll and colleagues have proposed calculating 
a payment level for primary care providers based on a budget 
reasonably expected to cover the personnel and operating expenses 
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 for a primary care practice, divided by the number of patients of a 
particular need/risk level the practice could be expected to manage. 
(See “Fundamental Reform of Payment for Adult Primary Care: 
Comprehensive Payment for Comprehensive Care,” by Allan H. 
Goroll, Robert A. Berenson, Stephen C. Schoenbaum, and 
Laurence B. Gardner, Journal of General Internal Medicine, 2007.) 
Options 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 are both consistent with either a bidding 
model or a negotiation model of pricing; in each case, the provider 
proposes a price and the payer would either accept or reject the 
price. Option 4.3.2 would introduce a “starting point” for bidding 
or negotiations through the recommended payment level. 
Option 4.3.3: For each combination of patient age/risk for which a separate 
preventive care management payment will be made, a national, state, 
or regional public–private collaborative (with representation from both payers 
and providers) should determine a payment level based on a study to 
estimate the cost of delivering good quality care for those types of 
patients. Providers should accept the payment level as payment in full for 
the care provided to patients in that category. 
Establishing a uniform payment level across all providers and payers 
in a region will likely raise anti-trust concerns. A special ruling from 
the U.S. attorney general and state attorney(s) general, or legislation, 
may be needed to provide a safe harbor for such a pricing approach 
if appropriate benefits can be demonstrated. 
 
Issue 4.4: What level of service or performance should be required in 
order to receive the base payment level? 
Because of concerns that many patients are not receiving elements 
of care that have been determined to be appropriate or necessary, 
most current pay-for-performance systems have an explicit or 
implicit goal of encouraging, but not mandating, that providers reach 
100% compliance with certain processes that have been 
demonstrated to improve patient outcomes. However, an 
alternative approach would be to define processes where 100% 
compliance is considered essential (except where they are clearly 
contraindicated or where the patient is participating in a clinical 
trial explicitly to test new processes) and to require that those 
processes be performed in order to receive payment. 
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 Option 4.4.1: Payers and/or a public–private collaborative (involving both payers 
and providers) should define those prevention processes that are 
considered mandatory for patients in a particular age/severity 
category, and providers should only be paid if those processes are 
delivered, unless there is clear documentation that the processes are 
contraindicated for the patient or if the patient is participating in a 
formal clinical trial of alternative processes. 
Option 4.4.2: No mandatory processes should be established in order for 
providers to receive payment. 
 
Issue 4.5: Should financial incentives beyond the basic payment level 
be provided for differences in performance? 
Option 4.5.1: Specific financial incentives should not be provided to providers; 
instead, comparative information for payers and patients on 
performance levels and prices should be used to drive 
improvements in performance. 
Option 4.5.2: Specific financial incentives should be provided for those aspects of 
care for which the payment system provides inadequate incentives 
or undesirable disincentives. 
Section II-B discusses the areas where incentives may be needed. 
The detailed issues and options for how to implement specific 
financial incentive programs are discussed in Section VII. 
 
Issue 4.6: How should patients be encouraged to choose high-
quality/low-cost providers? 
Option 4.6.1: Patients should be given complete discretion to choose providers, using 
available information on quality and cost of providers as they wish. 
Option 4.6.2: Payers should give patients financial incentives (e.g., lower copays or 
co-insurance amounts) for using providers with higher quality 
and/or lower cost. 
Option 4.6.3: Payers should give patients financial disincentives (e.g., higher copays 
or co-insurance amounts) for using providers with lower quality 
and/or higher cost. 
Option 4.6.4: Payers should refuse to pay for care by the lowest quality and highest 
cost providers. 
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 Issue 4.7: How should patients be encouraged or assisted to adhere to 
preventive care processes that affect outcomes or costs? 
Option 4.7.1: Payers should provide financial incentives to patients (e.g., bonuses 
or reduced copays) for adherence with care processes required or 
recommended by their health care provider. 
Option 4.7.2: Payers should provide financial incentives to providers based on the 
level of patient involvement in care planning and/or patient 
adherence with care processes. 
Option 4.7.3: Providers should provide financial incentives to patients (e.g., 
bonuses or reduced copays) for adherence with care processes 
required or recommended by the provider. 
Option 4.7.4: Providers should establish proactive systems for educating, monitoring, 
and encouraging patient adherence, but no explicit financial incentives 
should be provided to patients. 
 
2. Example of a Possible Payment System for Preventive Care 
The following is just one example of how the options from the issues described above 
could be combined into a new method of payment for preventive care. 
 
Method of Payment 
• A single provider would be designated as the preventive care manager for an 
individual and be paid a periodic, prospectively defined preventive care 
management payment (CMP) to cover a full range of preventive care services for 
the patient, with the amount adjusted for the age/risk of the patient. In addition, 
the preventive care manager would be paid on a fee-for-service basis for actual 
preventive services provided beyond basic care management (e.g., immunizations). 
These payments would not be expected to cover either minor or major acute 
episodes, or prevention associated with management of a chronic condition, which 
would be covered under other payment systems. 
 
Defining a Recommended Base Payment Amount 
• A recommended amount for the preventive CMP and fees for prevention services 
would be established by a regional public/private collaborative (involving both 
payers and providers) based on the patient’s age and risk factors. 
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 • The recommended CMP amount and service fees would be based on the 
estimated cost of delivering the care management and prevention elements of the 
Clinical Practice Guideline (where one exists) for patients of that age and risk level. 
• The CMP would include the estimated costs of services by all providers involved 
in the preventive care, along with a standard allocation of the payment to 
individual providers based on the proportion of the overall cost attributable to 
each provider. 
 
Defining the Actual Base Payment Amount 
• Providers or groups of providers would define and announce their actual CMP and 
service fees (i.e., their “price”) for a particular age/risk combination as a 
percentage of the suggested CMP and fees. Providers could charge different 
amounts to different payers, including individuals self-paying for care. 
• Groups of providers could agree to share the CMP in any way they wished, either 
based on the standard allocation or a different allocation (e.g., based on cost savings 
achieved beyond the estimated costs of care). In the absence of such an agreement, 
the payer would pay each provider a standard allocation of the CMP times the 
provider’s percentage discount/premium. 
 
Conditions for Receiving the Base Payment Amount 
• Patients would be entered into a regional registry so that outcomes could be 
tracked for purposes of measuring performance. 
• The CMP would be paid on a monthly basis to the provider serving as the 
patient’s preventive care manager in order to provide all preventive care. Service 
fees would be paid based on billings from the preventive care manager. 
• Retroactive adjustments to payments would be made for cases where all 
mandatory care elements of the Clinical Practice Guideline for patients of that age 
and with those risk factors had not been provided, unless the provider certified that 
a particular element was contraindicated for the patient in question. 
• Payment would not depend on which health care professional provided the care 
(as long as the professional was licensed to do so), or when or where the care was 
provided (e.g., in one office visit, multiple office visits, in the home, etc.). 
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 Adjustments to the Base Payment Amount 
• The CMP amount would be adjusted periodically in response to updates in 
Clinical Practice Guidelines, the discounts offered by providers, new technologies, 
inflation, etc. 
• Providers would be permitted to revise their actual CMP rates upward at most 
yearly, but would be encouraged to revise them downward whenever possible. 
• No adjustment in payment would be made for patients requiring significantly 
more services or costs than were assumed in computing the base payment level, 
but the outlier cases would be documented and used to adjust the age/risk 
categories and/or future base payment levels in the next year. 
 
Performance Measurement and Incentives 
• The preventive care manager would report publicly and receive a bonus payment 
based on the level of outcomes for patients paid for under the CMP and/or the 
level of provider compliance with non-mandatory processes under the Clinical 
Practice Guideline. 
• The amount of the bonus would be based on a portion of the present value of 
avoided costs associated with the improved outcomes or process compliance. (For 
example, if the rate of acute episodes for patients declined, then the bonus payment 
would be based on a portion of the estimated cost of the avoided payments.) 
• Groups of providers could agree to share the bonus payment in any way they wished. 
 
Encouraging Patients to Promote Quality and Cost Containment 
• Patients using the highest-quality, lowest-cost providers would have no copayments. 
• Patients would also receive a financial reward based on adherence with both 
processes and outcomes (e.g., stopping smoking, getting immunizations, lowering 
cholesterol level) recommended by their preventive care manager. 
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 VII. INCENTIVES FOR PERFORMANCE BEYOND BASIC 
PAYMENT STRUCTURES 
Section VI dealt with issues associated with the first key question defined in the Introduction: 
What changes should be made in current health care payment systems in order to eliminate (or 
significantly reduce) the current penalties and disincentives for higher-quality, lower-cost health care? 
 
This section deals with issues associated with the second key question: What 
additional rewards or incentives, if any, should be included in health care payment systems in order to 
encourage higher quality, lower-cost health care? Issues 1.11, 2.7, 3.7, and 4.5 in Section VI 
asked generally whether incentives should be provided, but not how they should be 
structured. This section addresses the following nine issues associated with the details of 
how incentives should be structured, assuming that some incentives are to be provided. 
 
5.1 How should payments be changed based on provider compliance with non-
mandatory processes? 
5.2 How should payments be changed based on provider achievement of better patient 
outcomes? 
5.3 How should payments be changed based on reduced utilization of services (or 
otherwise lower costs or slower growth in costs)? 
5.4 How should payments be changed based on achievement of higher patient 
satisfaction levels? 
5.5 Should payments be changed based on any other situations? 
5.6 What threshold of performance should trigger payment changes? 
5.7 How large should rewards or penalties be relative to base payment levels? 
5.8 How should high-cost patients be protected against exclusion from care? 
5.9 Should there be any adjustment in provider payment levels to reflect the costs of 
information technology needed to comply with requirements for reporting on 
processes, outcomes, patient satisfaction, or reduced utilization/cost? 
 
This section is not divided into the different types of patients/conditions that were 
used in the preceding section. However, the decisions about each of the issues here will 
likely differ for each category of patient/condition and will depend on the specific 
payment system designed for that category. 
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 Issue 5.1: How should payments be changed based on compliance 
with non-mandatory processes? 
Issues 1.9, 2.6, 3.5, and 4.4 in Section VI asked whether any 
processes should be considered mandatory in order for a provider to 
receive payment. This issue asks whether and how payments should 
be changed based on compliance with processes that are not viewed 
as mandatory in order to receive the base payment. 
Option 5.1.1: Bonus payments above the base payment level should be awarded to 
providers that demonstrate higher compliance with non-mandatory care 
guidelines in all diagnosis/severity categories where such guidelines exist. 
Option 5.1.2: Bonus payments above the base payment level should be awarded to 
providers that demonstrate higher compliance with non-mandatory care 
guidelines only for diagnosis/severity categories where outcomes cannot 
be measured effectively. 
Option 5.1.3: Reductions below the base payment level should be made for providers 
that demonstrate poor compliance with non-mandatory care guidelines. 
Option 5.1.4: Payment levels should not be changed for higher or lower compliance 
with non-mandatory care guidelines, but compliance rates should be 
publicized for use by payers and patients in determining which 
provider to use. (Rewards or penalties could still be provided based 
on differences in patient outcomes, as discussed in Issue 5.2.) 
See Issues 5.6 and 5.7 below regarding the threshold of performance 
for bonus payments and the amount of bonus payments. 
 
Issue 5.2: How should payments be changed based on achievement of 
better patient outcomes? 
Option 5.2.1: Bonus payments above the base payment level should be awarded to 
providers that achieve better outcomes for patients in a particular 
diagnosis/severity category. 
Option 5.2.2: Reductions in payment below the base payment level should be 
made to providers that achieve poorer outcomes for patients in a 
particular diagnosis/severity category. 
Option 5.2.3: Payment levels should not be changed for better or worse outcomes, but 
outcomes should be publicized to help payers and patients in 
determining which provider to use. 
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 Issue 5.3: How should payments be changed based on reduced 
utilization of services (or otherwise lower costs or slower 
growth in costs)? 
Option 5.3.1: Bonus payments above the base payment level should be awarded to 
providers or groups of providers that achieve lower levels of utilization 
for patients in a particular diagnosis/severity category. 
Option 5.3.2: Reductions in payment below the base payment level should be made 
to providers or groups of providers that have higher levels of 
utilization for patients in a particular diagnosis/severity category. 
Option 5.3.3: Bonuses or reductions in payment should be made based on 
differences in outcomes that have a direct relationship to long-term and 
indirect costs for the payer or patient, e.g., lengths of stay, 
readmission rates, etc. 
See Section II-E for a discussion of different categories of costs. 
Option 5.3.4: Bonuses in payment should not be explicitly based on factors related to 
utilization or costs; providers should reflect higher efficiency and 
lower costs through lower prices or combined price packages (e.g., 
capitation-type arrangements), and payers should reward providers that 
offer lower prices by encouraging or requiring patients to use these 
providers rather than higher-cost providers. 
 
Issue 5.4: How should payments be changed based on achievement of 
higher patient satisfaction levels? 
Option 5.4.1: Bonus payments above the base payment level should be awarded to 
providers that demonstrate higher levels of patient satisfaction within a 
particular diagnosis/severity category. 
Option 5.4.2: Reductions below the base payment level should be made for providers 
that demonstrate lower levels of patient satisfaction within a particular 
diagnosis/severity category. 
Option 5.4.3: Payment levels should not be changed for higher or lower levels of 
patient satisfaction, but patient satisfaction levels should be publicized to 
help payers and patients in determining which provider to use. 
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 Issue 5.5: Should payments be changed based on any other situations? 
Option 5.5.1: Payers should provide financial incentives to providers to encourage 
them to discuss treatment options with patients and help patients 
choose the most cost-effective treatment options. 
 
Issue 5.6: What threshold of performance should trigger 
payment changes? 
These options would be applicable to any of the bonus/penalty 
systems established under Issues 5.1–5.5. NOTE: Options are 
described in terms of bonus payments, but similar options can be 
defined for payment reductions if the options involving penalties in 
Issues 5.1–5.5 are chosen. 
Option 5.6.1: An absolute threshold of performance should be established at a high 
level, and bonus payments should only be awarded for performance 
above that level. The threshold could initially be based on current 
provider performance (e.g., the 80th or 90th percentile), but would 
not be reduced even if provider performance decreased. The 
threshold could be increased in the future, either based on 
demonstrated improvements in performance by providers or based 
on a desire by payers to encourage performance improvements. 
Option 5.6.2: An absolute threshold of performance should be established at a 
moderate level, and bonus payments should only be awarded for 
performance above that level. The threshold could initially be based 
on current provider performance (e.g., the 50th percentile), but 
would not be reduced even if provider performance decreased. The 
threshold could be increased in the future, either based on 
demonstrated improvements in performance by providers or based 
on a desire by payers to encourage performance improvements. 
Option 5.6.3: A relative threshold of performance should be established at a high 
level based on the current performance of providers (e.g., the 80th 
or 90th percentile of current provider performance), and bonus 
payments should only be awarded for performance above that level. 
The threshold would be adjusted periodically based on the actual 
performance of providers and could be increased or decreased if the 
performance level of the best providers increases or decreases. 
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 Option 5.6.4: A relative threshold of performance should be established at a moderate 
level based on the current performance of providers (e.g., the 50th 
percentile of current provider performance), and bonus payments 
should only be awarded for performance above that level. The 
threshold would be adjusted periodically based on the actual 
performance of providers and could be increased or decreased if the 
performance level of the best providers increases or decreases. 
A moderate threshold enables providers to receive rewards for 
smaller improvements in performance than does a high threshold. 
An absolute threshold gives providers a definitive target to aim for, 
whereas with a relative threshold, a provider may improve 
performance significantly, but fail to receive a bonus payment if 
other providers also improve by similar or greater amounts. 
Option 5.6.5: The threshold of performance should be the provider’s own prior 
performance, and bonus payments should be awarded for 
improvements in performance above the previous level. 
 
Issue 5.7: How large should rewards or penalties be relative to base 
payment levels? 
Option 5.7.1: The reward for higher performance in a category of 
diagnosis/severity should be a relatively small percentage of the base 
payment level for that category (e.g., less than 10%). Rewards should 
be proportionately higher for higher levels of performance above the 
minimum threshold. 
Option 5.7.2: The reward for higher performance in a category of 
diagnosis/severity should be a relatively large percentage of the base 
payment level for that category (e.g., 10–50%). Rewards should be 
proportionately higher for higher levels of performance above the 
minimum threshold. 
Option 5.7.3: The reward for higher performance in a category of 
diagnosis/severity should be a relatively small percentage of the base 
payment level for that category (e.g., less than 10%). Rewards should 
be the same for all providers performing above the minimum threshold. 
Option 5.7.4: The reward for higher performance in a category of 
diagnosis/severity should be a relatively large percentage of the base 
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 payment level for that category (e.g., 10–50%). Rewards should be 
the same for all providers performing above the minimum threshold. 
Option 5.7.5: The reward for higher performance in a category of diagnosis/ 
severity should be based on a portion of the estimated reductions in total 
costs to payers from the higher performance levels (e.g., if hospital 
readmission rates are lower, the reward would be a proportion of 
the estimated savings to the payer from fewer readmissions). 
If rewards were proportional to reductions in costs to payers, they 
would also likely be proportional to reduced revenues to the 
provider, thereby offsetting some of the inherent financial 
disincentive that providers experience when they improve 
outcomes in ways that also reduce their revenues. 
 
Issue 5.8: How should high-cost patients be protected against 
exclusion from care? 
Option 5.8.1: Bonus payments above the base payment level should be awarded 
to providers that demonstrate significantly higher average levels of 
patient severity (upon admission) within a particular 
diagnosis/severity category. 
Option 5.8.2: Reductions below the base payment level should be made for 
providers that demonstrate significantly lower average levels of 
patient severity (upon admission) within a particular 
diagnosis/severity category. 
Option 5.8.3: No adjustments in payment should be made. Other mechanisms 
should be used to protect patients against inappropriate exclusion 
from care. 
 
Issue 5.9: Should there be any adjustment in payment levels to reflect 
costs of information technology that providers need to 
comply with requirements for reporting on processes, 
outcomes, patient satisfaction, or reduced utilization/cost? 
Option 5.9.1: No adjustment in payment levels should be made to reflect costs of 
information technology needed for compliance, particularly if 
providers receive higher payments for improved performance. 
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 Option 5.9.2: No adjustment in payment levels should be made to reflect costs of 
information technology needed for compliance, but a loan program 
should be established to enable small providers to finance the costs of 
technology acquisition. 
Option 5.9.3: A cost-sharing arrangement should be established between payers and 
providers to help cover the costs of information technology that 
enables compliance monitoring. 
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 VIII. PATIENT CATEGORIES, CARE GUIDELINES, COSTS, 
MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE, AND TRANSPARENCY 
To varying degrees, Sections VI and VII presume the existence of: 
 
• Categories of diagnosis and patient severity (and age and risk) for which payment 
levels can be consistently established; 
• Guidelines for care (often called Clinical Practice Guidelines) for each category 
of diagnosis and patient severity; 
• Estimates of the cost to providers of following guidelines for care in an 
efficient manner; 
• Performance measures for each category of diagnosis and patient severity; and 
• Methods of collecting and reporting on performance measures. 
 
In many regions of the country, systems are in place for one or more of these 
activities, but in others, they are not. In addition, concerns have been raised about 
whether the processes that are in place at the national level are moving quickly enough. 
This section discusses these issues and options for addressing them. 
 
Issue 6.1: How should diagnosis/severity categories be established? 
Option 6.1.1: A national public–private collaborative, with representation from both 
payers and providers, should establish a comprehensive set of 
diagnosis/severity categories that should be used by all payers and 
by entities establishing care guidelines and performance measures. 
Option 6.1.2: Regional or state public–private collaboratives, with representation from 
both payers and providers, should establish diagnosis/severity 
categories that should be used by all payers in the affected region/ 
state and by entities establishing care guidelines and performance 
measures. Efforts should be made to coordinate the development 
and use of payment/severity categories across states and regions. 
Option 6.1.3: Each payer should establish diagnosis/severity categories that it will 
use. Each payer should attempt to coordinate the development and 
use of payment/severity categories within the local region as well as 
with payers in other regions. 
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 Issue 6.2: How should care guidelines be established for each 
diagnosis/severity category? 
Option 6.2.1: One or more national public–private collaboratives, with representation 
from payers, providers, and consumers, should establish care 
guidelines (distinguishing mandatory and non-mandatory processes) 
for each diagnosis/severity category, beginning with the categories 
affecting the largest numbers of patients and the largest amounts of 
health care expenditures. All payers should use these care guidelines 
as the basis for establishing payments and/or performance-based 
payment adjustments. An aggressive timetable should be established 
so that guidelines can be used for payment systems. 
Option 6.2.2: Regional or state public–private collaboratives, with representation from 
payers, providers, and consumers, should establish care guidelines 
(distinguishing mandatory and non-mandatory processes) for each 
diagnosis/severity category where national guidelines have not been 
adopted. Efforts should be made to coordinate the development 
and use of care guidelines across states and regions to avoid 
duplication of effort. All payers in the affected region/state should 
use these care guidelines as the basis for establishing payments and 
performance-based payment adjustments. Where care guidelines are 
developed and utilized in different regions/states, evaluations should 
be conducted to assess the differences in outcomes resulting from 
use of different care guidelines. 
 
Issue 6.3: How should the costs of quality care be determined for 
each diagnosis/severity category? 
Option 6.3.1: One or more national, state, or regional public–private 
collaboratives, with representation from payers, providers, and 
consumers, should determine the actual cost of providing care 
consistent with care guidelines as currently achieved by the most efficient 
providers/systems for each diagnosis/severity category, beginning 
with the categories affecting the largest numbers of patients and the 
largest amounts of health care expenditures. Providers with good 
cost-accounting systems should contribute cost information on a 
confidential basis for analysis in determining these costs. 
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 Option 6.3.2: One or more national, state, or regional public–private 
collaboratives, with representation from payers, providers, and 
consumers, should estimate the achievable cost of providing care 
consistent with care guidelines for each diagnosis/severity category 
using management and engineering analyses, beginning with the 
categories affecting the largest numbers of patients and the largest 
amounts of health care expenditures. Providers with good cost-
accounting systems should contribute cost information on a 
confidential basis for analysis in estimating these costs. 
Option 6.3.1 estimates costs based on the best that providers have 
actually achieved to date, whereas Option 6.3.2 estimates costs based 
on what is theoretically achievable. 
 
Issue 6.4: How should performance measures be established for each 
diagnosis/severity category? 
Option 6.4.1: One or more national public–private collaboratives, with representation 
from payers, providers, and consumers, should establish performance 
measures for each diagnosis/severity category, beginning with the 
categories affecting the largest numbers of patients and the largest 
amounts of health care expenditures. All payers should use these 
performance measures as the basis for performance-based payment 
adjustments. An aggressive timetable should be established so that 
the performance measures can be used for payment systems. 
Option 6.4.2: Regional or state public–private collaboratives, with representation from 
payers, providers, and consumers, should establish performance 
measures for each diagnosis/severity category where national 
measures have not been adopted. Efforts should be made to 
coordinate the development and use of performance measures 
across states and regions to avoid duplication of effort. All payers in 
the affected region/state should use these performance measures as 
the basis for performance-based payment adjustments. 
 
Issue 6.5: How should care guidelines and performance measures 
be evaluated? 
To the extent that process measures are used, extensive and rapid 
research is needed to determine the relationship between processes 
and outcomes. 
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 Option 6.5.1: A well-funded national program of research should be established to 
continuously evaluate and update care guidelines and to determine 
the relationship between compliance with care processes and 
improved patient outcomes. 
Option 6.5.2: Regional programs of research should be established to conduct 
studies of the relationship between compliance with care processes 
and improved patient outcomes. 
 
Issue 6.6: Who should collect and report performance measures? 
Option 6.6.1: Providers (or groups of providers) should be responsible for collecting 
and reporting on performance measures associated with the patients 
they care for, consistent with standards established at the national, 
state, or regional level. 
Option 6.6.2: Payers should be responsible for collecting and reporting on the 
performance of providers caring for the patients covered by their 
payment plans, consistent with standards established at the national, 
state, or regional level. 
Option 6.6.3: Regional/state collaboratives should be responsible for collecting 
and reporting on the performance of providers supplying care in 
their geographic area, consistent with standards established at the 
national level. 
 
Issue 6.7: Should performance levels of providers on process, outcome, 
patient satisfaction, and/or efficiency be publicly available? 
Option 6.7.1: Public disclosure of performance levels should be at the discretion of 
the individual provider. 
Option 6.7.2: A regional or state health information organization should collect and 
publicly report a subset of performance measures in a way that is 
meaningful to citizens. 
Option 6.7.3: Payers should make all performance measures used for bonus or 
penalty payments publicly available. 
To the extent that information about both quality and price (see 
Issue 6.8) is made publicly available, it would also be possible to 
develop and report on measures of value (i.e., the ratio of quality 
to price). 
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 Issue 6.8: Should providers’ payment levels (prices) for diagnosis/ 
severity categories be publicly available? 
Option 6.8.1: Public disclosure of prices for diagnosis/severity categories should 
be at the discretion of the provider or the payer. 
Option 6.8.2: Providers should publish the prices they will charge self-pay patients for 
each diagnosis/severity category. 
Option 6.8.3: Providers should publish the range of prices they charge all payers for 
each diagnosis/severity category. 
Option 6.8.4: Payers should publish the prices they pay providers for each 
diagnosis/severity category. 
Option 6.8.5: A regional or state public/private collaborative should publish the prices 
that payers pay providers for each diagnosis/severity category. 
To the extent that information about both price and quality (see 
Issue 6.7) is made publicly available, it would also be possible to 
develop and report on measures of value (i.e., the ratio of quality 
to price). 
Publishing prices for multiple providers can raise anti-trust concerns, 
so this will need to be done in consultation with the U.S. attorney 
general and state attorney(s) general. Legislation may be needed to 
provide a safe harbor for such an approach if appropriate benefits 
can be demonstrated. 
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 IX. IMPLEMENTATION OF CHANGES IN PAYMENT SYSTEMS 
This section addresses issues associated with implementation of whatever payment system 
is developed based on the issues discussed in Sections VI, VII, and VIII. 
 
In addition to reaching consensus on the desired structure of payment systems, it is 
critical to define a feasible path for actually implementing the changes needed to achieve 
those structures. 
 
Issue 7.1: How should payment changes be phased in? 
Option 7.1.1: Demonstrations of alternative payment systems for particular 
diagnosis/severity categories should be developed and tested in 
individual regions of the country. All payers in a region with a 
demonstration project should pay for patients in the specific 
diagnosis/severity category using the same basic payment structure, 
in order to insure that the same incentives exist for all patients in 
that category and for all providers, and to insure that there are no 
competitive advantages or disadvantages created for different payers. 
(This would require waivers or demonstration projects for national 
payers such as Medicare.) The U.S. Department of Justice should 
work proactively to provide guidance to payers to avoid anti-trust 
concerns, and/or recommend legislative modifications to Congress 
if necessary, in order to enable effective alignment of payment 
systems. When a region’s payment demonstration project proves to 
be successful, other regions should adopt it and, ideally, all payers in 
all regions. 
Option 7.1.2: National payers (e.g., Medicare, national private insurance plans, 
etc.) should develop and implement new payment systems and then 
encourage regional payers to adopt them. 
 
Issue 7.2: Should payment changes be required to be “budget neutral”? 
“Budget neutral” means that the cost to a payer is no greater or less 
under the new payment system than it would have been under the 
previous payment system. Budget neutrality is generally viewed as 
being measured over a one-year timeframe—the typical length of a 
government budget year or health insurance contract. As noted in 
Section II-E, a short timeframe can cause distortions in incentives, 
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 because some short-run cost savings can lead to longer-run cost 
increases, and vice versa. 
Option 7.2.1: Initial demonstrations of alternative payment systems should focus 
on diagnosis/severity categories where reductions in average 
expenditures for care seem possible based on the current 
distribution of costs across providers (i.e., categories where some 
providers have demonstrated lower costs with equal or better 
outcomes than others). 
Option 7.2.2: Initial demonstrations of alternative payment systems should focus 
on combinations of diagnosis/severity categories where possible 
reductions in average expenditures in one category will offset 
possible increases in short-run average expenditures in another (e.g., 
for categories where there are significant differences in quality but 
higher short-run costs for higher quality). Payers (particularly 
employers, rather than health plans) will also need to explicitly 
recognize the value of reductions in indirect costs and long-run costs, 
since some increases in short-run direct costs may be necessary to 
reduce indirect costs or long-term costs. (See Section II-E.) 
 
Issue 7.3: How should the effects of payment changes be evaluated? 
Option 7.3.1: A well-funded national program of research should be established to 
evaluate the effects of new payment systems and identify areas 
where problems exist or where there are opportunities to further 
improve value. In addition, a standard set of definitions and 
measures for evaluations should be established to insure 
comparability of results across evaluations. 
Option 7.3.2: Regional programs of research should be established to evaluate the 
effects of new payment systems and identify areas where problems 
exist or where there are opportunities to further improve value. 
A network of researchers should be created in order to establish a 
standard set of definitions and measures for evaluations in order to 
promote comparability of results across evaluations. 
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 X. CONCLUSION 
Unfortunately, there are no easy answers regarding which options are best for most of the 
issues identified in Sections VI, VII, VIII, and IX. In some cases, one option may seem 
preferable, but concerns exist about potential unintended consequences. In other cases, 
there is simply insufficient knowledge or experience as to how providers or patients will 
respond to enable a preferred option to be identified. This uncertainty is due to the fact 
that there have been relatively few cases where significantly different payment systems 
have been attempted, and even fewer where thorough evaluations have been conducted. 
 
One clear conclusion that can be drawn, therefore, is that payment demonstration 
projects must be developed, implemented, and evaluated in order to make progress on 
payment reform. There is growing consensus that the serious problems of quality and cost 
affecting the health care system cannot be fixed without fundamental changes in the way 
the nation pays for health care, and so projects to test and demonstrate alternative payment 
systems must be a high priority. 
 
A second conclusion is that a wide variety of payment demonstrations are needed. 
Not only are there many different issues, and multiple options for resolving each of those 
issues, but every region of the country is also different in terms of the number, types, and 
relationships of health care purchasers, payers, and providers. Just as experimentation and 
evaluation is a hallmark of evidence-based medicine, experimentation and evaluation will also 
likely be needed in order to develop the most effective cure for the ills of the payment system. 
 
This leads to a third conclusion that may surprise many: The leadership for 
payment reform demonstrations should come from the regional level, rather than the 
national level. Health care is a fundamentally regional enterprise, since most providers and 
even most payers operate exclusively or primarily in metropolitan regions, states, or multi-
state areas. Just as there will likely not be any single method of payment that will work for 
all types of patients and conditions, there may also not be a single type of payment system 
that will work in all parts of the country. 
 
While payment demonstrations can and should be pursued at the regional level, 
this does not mean that payment reform should be a parochial enterprise. Indeed, just as 
medicine itself advances the state of the art through local innovations that are supported, 
replicated, and evaluated nationally, so too can payment reform be more successful if there 
is national support for the development, evaluation, and replication of regional payment 
demonstrations. Both the federal government and private foundations can play a major 
role in helping to support this. 
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